James Sanchez v. Little America Hotel Corporation : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
James Sanchez v. Little America Hotel Corporation
: Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dale F. Gardiner, Robert J. Debry; Attorney for Appellant.
Theodore E. Kanell; Hanson, Epperson and Smith; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Sanchez v. Little America Hotel, No. 880316.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2275
) r v, NT 
15.9 
.59 
DOCKET NO 
K M L 
j&SStfc 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE (IF IJTMt 
JAMES SANCHEZ, * 
Plaintiff-Appellant, * 
vs . * 
* 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION * 
a Utah Corporation, MARTIN STERN,* 
JR., AIA ARCHITECT & ASSOC, + 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION, a Utah * 
Corporation, ROCKY MOUNTAIN * 
POOLS, INC., a Utah Corporation, * 
HIGHAM-HILTON MECHANICAL * 
CONTRACTORS, INC., a Utah * 
Corporation and JOHN DOES I * 
THROUGH III, * 
* 
Defendant-Respondents. * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN POOLS, INC 
CASE NO. : it80316 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorney for Respondent 
Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 1M L I 0-:>9"'0 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Robert J. Debry 
Robert J. Debry and Associates 
Attorney for Appellant 
4001 South 700 East, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
V „ 4-. 
A F R H J9S) 
CicfJc, 3ip . ' *"ourt, Ual* 
Lee Henning 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Higham-Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jeffrey Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Respondent Martin Stern, Jr., 
AIA Architects & Associates 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Donald J. Purser 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BARRETT, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent Okland Construction Co. 
39 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Paul Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Cross-Claimant/Appellant 
Little America Hotel Corp. 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES SANCHEZ, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Robert J. Debry 
Robert J. Debry and Associates 
Attorney for Appellant 
4001 South 700 East, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
* 
* BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* ROCKY MOUNTAIN POOLS, INC. 
* 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorney for Respondent 
Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION * 
a Utah Corporation, MARTIN STERN,* CASE NO.: 880316 
JR., AIA ARCHITECT & ASSOC, * 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION, a Utah * 
Corporation, ROCKY MOUNTAIN * 
POOLS, INC., a Utah Corporation, * 
HIGHAM-HILTON MECHANICAL * 
CONTRACTORS, INC., a Utah * 
Corporation and JOHN DOES I * 
THROUGH III, *• 
* 
Defendant-Respondents. * 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE 
Lee Henning 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Higham-Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jeffrey Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Respondent Martin Stern, Jr., 
AIA Architects & Associates 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Donald J. Purser 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BARRETT, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent Okland Construction Co. 
39 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Paul Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Cross-Claimant/Appellant 
Little America Hotel Corp. 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I. 
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are: 
James Sanchez 
Martin Stern, Jr., AIA Architects 
and Associates 
Okland Construction 
Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. 
Higham-Hilton Mechanical 
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Defendant/Respondent 
Defendant/Respondent 
Defendant/Respondent 
Defendant/Respondent 
Little America Hotel Corp., a defendant in the lower court 
proceedings is not a party in this proceeding but is the 
appellant in a related appeal. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND DESCRIPTION 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction of 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2 
(3)(i) and the Utah Constitution Article VIII, § 3. 
This is an appeal from an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants, which the District Court 
certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as a final order. 
V. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges to 
immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty or property without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person in its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
All political power is inherent in the people 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and 
benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare 
may require. 
Utah Const, art. I § 2. 
All courts shall be open, and every person 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any trial in 
this State, by himself or counsel, in any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const, art. I § 11. 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
Utah Const, art. I § 24. 
The provisions of this Constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory unless by express 
words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Utah Const, art. I § 26. 
Section 78-12-25.5 provides for the following: 
Injury due to defective design or 
construction of improvement to real property-
-Within seven years.— No action to recover 
damages for any injury to property, real or 
personal, or for any injury to the person, or 
for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising 
out of the defective and unsafe condition of 
an improvement to real property, nor any 
action for damages sustained on account of 
such injury, shall be brought against any 
person performing or furnishing the design, 
planning, supervision of construction or 
construction of such improvement to real 
property more than seven years after the 
completion of construction. 
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, 
corporation, partnership, or any other legal 
entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the 
purpose of this act shall mean the date of 
issuance of a certificate of substantial 
2 
completion by the owner, architect, engineer 
or other agent, or the date of the owner's 
use or possession of the improvement on real 
property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision 
shall not apply to any person in actual 
possession and control as owner, tenant or 
otherwise, of the improvement at the time the 
defective and unsafe condition of such 
improvement constitutes the proximate cause 
of the injury for which it is proposed to 
bring an action. 
This provision shall not be construed as 
extending or limiting the period otherwise 
prescribed by laws of this state for the 
bringing of any action. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent contends that the Utah Architect's and 
Builder's Statute of Repose does not violate the Utah 
Constitution provision Article I, Section 11. The Builder's 
Statute of Repose complies with the requirements of 
constitutionality established in this Court's decision of Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) as well as 
other constitutional standards applied by courts throughout the 
country. Specifically, the statute provides an alternate remedy 
to the plaintiffs and, in the alternative, if no alternate 
remedy is provided there is a clear social and economic evil to 
be eliminated and the elimination of the existing legal remedy is 
3 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means by achieving the 
objective. There never was a common law right to sue a builder 
not in privity with an injured party. Finally, the decision in 
Berry should be re-examined in light of the due process 
requirements and the "open-court" provision. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION X 
In 1967 the Utah Legislature enacted Section 78-12-25.5 
U.C.A. (1953) for the purpose of limiting liability of builders 
and architects. This statute is commonly known as a "statute of 
repose" rather than a statute of limitation, in that the time 
period for such a statute runs from the occurrence of some event 
other than an injury that gives rise to a cause of action. See 
McGovern, "The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product 
Liability Statutes of Repose," 30 Am. U.L.Rev. 579, 582-587 
(1981). 
As of 1981, a total of 44 architect's and contractor's 
statutes of repose have been passed by various state 
legislatures. McGovern, supra at p. 587. A detailed chart of 
these statutes of repose is included in Appendix II. It should 
be noted, however, that since this chart was prepared in 1981 
there have been several states which have amended their statutes 
and therefore a small portion of the chart is inaccurate. 
1* See Appendix No. 1 
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The enactment of this large number of architect's and 
builder's statutes of repose resulted from several court 
decisions which greatly expanded the liability of these groups of 
individuals. Historically, courts have adhered to a requirement 
of "privity of contract/" as was established in the early case of 
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mn.W. 109, 152 Eng. Reprint 402 
(1842). In that case the court denied recovery to a third party 
who, after a structure had been completed and accepted by an 
owner, sought judgment against the architect and engineer for 
injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the defective or 
unsafe condition of the structure. 
In Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 143 N.E.2d 
895 (N.Y. 1957) the New York Court of Appeals held that the 
privity of contracts requirement was untenable and thereby 
ushered in an era in which architects and engineers were liable 
to parties who were injured regardless of whether there had been 
any contractual relationship with them. See Temple Sinai— 
Suburban Reform Temple v. Richmond, 308 A.2d 508 (R.I. 1973) 
(detailing the history of the demise of the privity of contract 
doctrine); see also, Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2D 543, 546 (R.I. 
1985); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 825 (Colo. 
1983). 
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In addition to this increased liability, the existing 
statutes of limitation proved to be completely inadequate in the 
building and architectural field. As one authority noted: 
Compounding the greatly expanded 
liability thus thrust upon architects and 
engineers in respect to third parties to whom 
the architects and engineers might be liable 
was the recognition that statutes of 
limitation afforded little or no protection. 
Such limitation period commenced, and the 
action against the architect or engineer 
accrued, when the third party was injured, 
notwithstanding the fact that such injury 
occurred many years after the design and 
construction of the structure causing the 
injury. . . . It is clear that under such 
circumstances, not even retirement would 
bring an end to an architect's or engineer's 
liability. Annotation, "Validity and 
Construction, As to Claim Alleging Design 
Defects, of Statute Imposing Time Limitations 
Upon Action Against Architects or Engineer 
for Injury or Death Arising Out of Defective 
of Unsafe Condition of Improvement to Real 
Property," 93 A.L.R. 3d 1242, 1246. 
There are principally three areas of law in which 
statutes of repose have been enacted. These include the 
architect and builder statutes, medical malpractice statutes, and 
product liability statutes. McGovern, supra at p. 587-588. A 
1981 summary of the medical malpractice statutes of repose and 
the product liability statutes of repose is included as Appendix 
III to this Brief. (Again, it should be noted that these charts 
are not current and are for the purpose of general information 
only.) 
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This Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985) held that the Utah product liability statute of 
repose was unconstitutional because it violated Article I, 
Section 11 and Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
In Berry a wrongful death action was maintained against the 
defendants based upon negligence, strict liability and breach of 
warranty. 
Appellant contends that Berry conclusively establishes 
that the architect statute of repose is likewise 
unconstitutional. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-10). Appellant 
maintains that under the two-pronged test enunciated in Berry 
there is no substitute remedy provided to parties claiming injury 
from building defects and, further, there is no social or 
economic evil to be eliminated with these statutes and the means 
for doing so is unreasonable. 
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the Berry 
decision and the two-pronged requirement can be satisfied by the 
Utah architectural statute of repose. A detailed analysis of 
this conclusion will immediately follow this introduction. In 
addition, however, Respondent believes that this Court should re-
examine its initial conclusions in Berry that Section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution does not Permit the Utah Legislature to 
7 
limit the time period in which a cause of action may arise. The 
overwhelming majority of states that have addressed this issue 
have ruled that their similar state constitutional provisions do 
not prohibit a state legislature from passing a statute of repose 
which prevents a cause of action from ever arising. This 
discussion will conclude the Section 11 argument. 
POINT I 
THE UTAH STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR ARCHITECTS AND BUILDERS 
SATISFIES THE SECTION 11 CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN BERRY 
IN THAT BOTH AN ALTERNATE REMEDY HAS BEEN PROVIDED 
BY THE LEGISLATURE AND THE STATUTE ADDRESSES A CLEAR 
ECONOMIC EVIL AND IS A REASONABLE MEANS FOR 
ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE. 
It is apparent from reading the Berry decision that the 
decision was limited solely to the Utah Product Liability Act and 
did not strike down all statutes of repose in other areas of law. 
This Court clearly evidenced that intent when it stated: 
In sum, Section 11 does not recede before 
every legislative enactmentf but neither may 
it be applied in a mechanical fashion to 
strike every statute with which there may be 
conflict. To hold every statute of repose 
unconstitutional without regard to the 
legislative purpose could result in a 
legislative inability to cope with widespread 
social or economic evils. 717 P.2d at 680. 
Under the Berry decision a statute of repose will 
satisfy Section 11 of the Constitution "if the law provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy 'by 
8 
due course of law for vindication of his constitutional 
interests." Id. at 680. This Court stated that the benefit of 
this substitution must be substantially equal in value to the 
remedy abrogated and must be essentially comparable to protect 
one's person, property or reputation "although the form of the 
substitute remedy may be different." Jd. Under the Utah 
Architect and Builder Statutes of Repose an alternate remedy is 
made available to an injured person as will be discussed in 
subpart A of this section. 
The second prong of the Berry decision states that if 
there is no alternate remedy, then the statute may still be 
upheld as constitutional if there is a clear social or economic 
evil to be eliminated and "the elimination of an existing legal 
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving 
the objective." .Id. at 680. As will be examined in subpart B of 
this section, the Legislature clearly dealt with an economic evil 
and did so by a reasonable means and in a rational manner. 
This conclusion is supported by the decisions of state 
courts interpreting similar state constitutional provisions as 
they relate to architectural and engineering statutes of repose. 
Respondent has independently conducted a survey of all decided 
cases interpreting these statutes and has summarized these 
decisions in Appendices IV, V, VI of this Brief. Appendix IV is 
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a chart summarizing the court decisions relating to the 
constitutionality of architect and builder statutes of repose. 
Appendix V is a summary of the eight state decisions which have 
held these types of statutes unconstitutional. Appendix VI is a 
summary of the decisions by the courts of twenty-seven states 
upholding these types of statutes. A detailed analysis of these 
summaries will be made throughout this Brief. 
A. The Utah Legislature has Provided an 
Alternate Remedy in the Building Statute of 
Repose and Therefore the Berry Criteria have 
been Satisfied. 
In Berry this Court addressed its previous decision 
concerning the constitutionality of the building statute of 
repose. This Court stated: 
Good v. Christensen, Utah, 527 P.2d 223 
(1974), sustained the constitutionality of a 
seven-year statute of repose intended to 
protect architects and builders. The court 
observed that a person injured by a defect in 
a building would still have a remedy against 
an owner of the building and perhaps others. 
77 P.2d at 83. (Emphasis added). 
The language of the statute provides that it does not 
apply "to any person in actual possession and control as owner, 
tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective 
and unsafe condition of such improvement constituted the 
proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring 
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an action." Thus, the statute does not apply to the owner or 
tenant of a building at the time the injury occurs. Similarly, 
the statute makes no attempt to exempt the supplier of component 
parts of the building. The only exemption applies to persons who 
actually design or perform the construction work of the building. 
In Berry the statute of repose for product liability 
contained no such exemption. That statute, 78-15-1 U.C.A. 
prevented any action from being brought against any person after 
the statutory period had elapsed. Thus not only was the 
manufacturer exempt from liability, but all other parties in the 
chain of distribution would also be exempt. 
Two state supreme courts have interpreted their builder 
statute of repose as allowing an alternate remedy. In Reeves v. 
Ille Electric Co., 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976) the Montana Supreme 
Court held a ten-year statute of repose for builders 
constitutional in light of a provision similar to Section II of 
Utah's Constitution and also in light of a due process clause 
similar to Utah's Constitution. The Court therein stated: 
Plaintiff's fourth constitutional attack 
upon Section 93-2619 is that the statute 
impairs "due process" guarantees by depriving 
plaintiff of a common law right without 
providing a reasonable substitute. This 
argument is without merit. Section 93-2621, 
R.C.M. 1947, part of the same enactment as 
Section 93-2619 (Ch. 60, Laws 1971), states: 
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"The limitation prescribed by this act 
shall not affect the responsibility of any 
owner, tenant, or person in actual 
possession and control of the improvement at 
the time a right of action arises." 
The plain words of Section 93-2621 
refute the implication of Plaintiff's 
argument that he is without a remedy. 
Id. at 652. 
In a recent decision the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
made a similar finding. In Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2d 543 (R.I. 
19 85) the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed the 
constitutionality of its architect's ten-year statute of repose 
in light of a similar "access" and "remedy" clause in its state 
constitution. The Rhode Island Supreme Court had previously held 
its product liability statute of repose unconstitutional on the 
basis that it had violated the constitutional guarantee of a 
"remedy for every wrong" found in the state constitution. 
Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.l. 1984). 
In distinguishing the prior product liability case from 
the architect case the court noted that the product liability 
statute prevented a Plaintiff from suing any defendant because of 
an injury caused by a defective process. The court cited an 
Illinois case which upheld its statute of repose on the basis 
that, while an action for strict liability had been denied, a 
negligence action still was available. The court then noted that 
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its constitutional provision does not prevent the legislature 
from changing the substance of the common law. It observed that 
in a prior Rhode Island case a statute had been enacted to 
protect charitable institutions from suits caused by negligence 
of their employees. The court observed that although the statute 
prevented plaintiffs from suing charitable hospitals directly the 
statute did not deprive the Plaintiff of their day in court. 
"Instead, it left the plaintiffs with a remedy against agents or 
employees of the hospital who were the initial tort feasors." Id. 
at 547. 
In finding a similar remedy existed under the 
architectural statute of repose, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
stated: 
In the case before us, an improver of real 
property will be subject to suit for ten 
years after its structure has been 
substantially completed. Thereafter, 
Plaintiffs seeking damages can resort to the 
courts for redress of injuries arising out of 
improvements to real property against the 
owners or operators of that improved 
property. Id. at 548. 
Thus, under the Utah statute, third parties who are 
injured after passage of the special limitation period are not 
completely without a remedy and may still pursue others, just as 
has been done in the instant case. See Note, "Actions Arising 
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Out of Improvements to Real Property: Special Statutes of 
Limitations," 57 N.D. L.R. 43, 78 (1981). 
Appellant contends that the statute does not provide a 
substitute remedy. (Appellant's Brief p. 18) He acknowledges 
that he may maintain his action against the landowner and tenant 
as the statute provides. The statute therefore does not cut 
off the plaintiff's action as Appellant would have this Court 
believe. (Appellant's Brief p. 13) The statute only defines who 
will be responsible for his damages. There is no practical 
limitation in this case. The injured plaintiff in this case is 
able to make a claim against the owner of the property for 
failure to discover the alleged defect during the minimum seven-
year period or against suppliers of defective component parts. 
In addition, most problems dealing with latent defects are 
brought about by the active negligence of others. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, under the first 
prong of the Berry test the Legislature did provide an alternate 
remedy and the statute of repose is therefore constitutional 
under Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
B. Assuming Arguendo That No Alternative Remedy 
Has Been Provided, the Architectural 
Statute of Repose Clearly Addresses an 
Economic Evil and is Not an Arbitrary or 
Unreasonable Means of Achieving that 
Objective. 
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This Court in Berry examined in minute detail both the 
proposed objectives of the Utah product liability act as well as 
the effect the act would have upon such objectives, 717 P.2d at 
681-683. The Court concluded that the Utah statute of repose 
"does not reasonably and substantially advance the stated purpose 
of the statute." Id. at 683. 
Appellant has made only minimal effort to attack the 
reasons behind the statute of repose in building cases. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-28). It should be kept in mind that 
it is the burden of the appellant to prove that there is a clear 
and complete violation of Section 11 rights. Simms v. Smith, 
571 P.2d 586 (Utah 1977). The appellant has a heavy burden in 
seeking to overcome the statute's presumption of 
constitutionality. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-509 
(1965). Every rational presumption is indulged in favor of the 
validity of an act of the legislature. Enforcement of such 
legislative enactment will not be refused unless its conflict 
with some provision of the constitution is established beyond 
reasonable doubt. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Commissioners of Insurance, 372 N.E.2d 520 (Mass. 1978). A 
court must sustain economic legislation if it has a permissible 
legislative objective and if the legislation bears a rational 
relation to that objective. "Whether [the statute is] wise or 
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effective is not, of course, the province of [courts]." Village 
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1196, 71 L.Ed. 2d 362 (1982). 
The legislative debate concerning the statute of 
repose is included as Appendix VII to this Brief. Several of the 
policies enunciated by courts in support of these types of 
statutes were specifically discussed in the legislative debate; 
where applicable, reference will be made to these discussions. 
Numerous other reasons have been advanced by various state and 
federal courts in support of these statutes. In addition, a 
review of the summaries of decisions contained in the Appendix 
shows that even those states which have struck down the statute 
of repose because of a classification deficiency based upon equal 
protection have nevertheless found that the legislature had 
legitimately enacted this type of statute. See, Fuiioka v. Kam, 
514 P.2d 568 (Hawaii 1973); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
All Electric, Inc., 660 P.2d 995, 1002 (Nev. 1983); (J. 
Springer, dissenting); Loyal Order of Moose Lodge v. Cavaness, 
563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977). 
The following are policy reasons for the enactment 
of statutes of repose in the building industry. These policies 
not only address the social evils being eradicated, but at the 
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same time show the rational basis between the concept of statutes 
of and the problems which have been created. 
1. Builders and Architects are Subjected to a Broad 
Scope of Liability that Requires Limitation. 
In Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 
A.2d 715 (Pa. 1976), the owner of a warehouse brought an action 
against the contractors of the building to recover damages for 
negligently planning, designing, and installing insulation 
material in the ceiling of the warehouse. In sustaining the 
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court made the following statement: 
It is manifestly rational to adjust time 
periods for liability for acts performed 
according to the substantive scope of the 
liability involved. The scope of liability 
of the class of builders differs 
significantly from that of the class of 
owners. First, the class of persons to whom 
builders may be liable is larger than the 
class to which owners may be liable. 
Landowners may be liable to others who come 
onto their land. Builders, however, may be 
liable both to the landowners and the others 
who use the land. Second, a builder may be 
liable for construction defects under various 
legal theories--contract, warranty, 
negligence and perhaps strict liability in 
tort. Landowner liability for such defects, 
on the other hand, typically lies only in 
tort, unless the landowner is a lessor, in 
which case he is liable only for events 
occurring while the tenants is in possession. 
Id. at 718. 
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Several other courts, in affirming their respective 
state architect and builder statutes of repose, have recognized 
the increased scope of liability of builders and architects as a 
reasonable ground for enactment of the statute. See Barnhous v. 
Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. App.1982); Cheswold 
Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction Co., 489 A.2d 413 
(Del. 1984); Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 
1983); and Lamb v. Wedaewood South Corp. , 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 
1983). 
2. It is Rational to Limit the Liability of Builders 
and Architects, Since They Have No Control Over the Building 
After Relinquishing it to the Owners. 
Generally, after the owner of a structure accepts the 
finished product the builder has no right to control the number 
and type of persons entering the land or regulate the condition 
of entry. Following acceptance of the completed structure, there 
is a possibility of neglect, abuse, poor maintenance, 
mishandling, improper modification, and unskilled repair. 
Neither the architect nor the builder has any opportunity to make 
ongoing inspections, as the owner does. 
Such distinctions have been recognized and accepted by 
numerous courts in sustaining the constitutionality of their 
respective state architect's and builder's statutes of repose. 
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See, Barnhous. supra,: Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp,, 655 P.2d 
822 (Colo. 1982); Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson 
Construction Co.,: 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1984); Mullis v. Southern 
Company Services, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982); Beecher v. White, 
447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983); Bermaster v. Gravity Drainage 
District, 366 S.2d 1381 (La. 1978); Howell v. Burk, 568 P.2d 214 
(N.M. App. 1977)i and Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork 
Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1976). 
3. Statistically, a Seven-Year Period in Which to 
Bring an Action Against Builders and Architects Will Encompass 
Almost All Claims That Will Arise. 
The overwhelming majority of claims brought against 
design and building professionals are brought within seven years 
of completion of construction. In testimony before the House 
District Committee, a representative of an insurance company 
which provides professional liability insurance to architects 
offered statistical data showing the percentage of claims brought 
in given years after completion of a project. This information 
is included as Appendix VIII to this Brief and was based upon 570 
random pending suits against architects. Hearing on H.R. 6527, 
H.R. 6678 and H.R. 11544 before Sub-Committee No. 1 of the 
House Committee on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st 
Session 28 (1967). The table indicates that by the end of the 
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seventh year after a project has been completed 97.9% of all 
claims have been asserted. 
One commentator noted this probability by stating: 
If an accident or damage related to the 
services performed by the architect or 
builder were to occur, it most likely would 
occur either during construction or within a 
relatively short period of time after 
completion of the structure. After that 
time, injuries or damages are most likely to 
be the result of improper maintenance on the 
part of the owner or occupier, or other 
factors over which architects and builders 
have no control. Collins, C.H., "Limitation 
of Action Statutes for Architects and 
B u i l d e r s — An E x a m i n a t i o n of 
Constitutionality," 29 Federation of 
Insurance Counsel Quarterly, 41, 49 (1978). 
During the discussion concerning the passage of the 
Utah bill; Representative Hill made the following statement: 
We feel that there is a time testing of 
the design capabilities of the design that 
has been furnished, and if there are any 
major errors or omissions, the team of the 
designer, the owner and the contractor should 
be able to uncover any major ones, such as 
you are all familiar with, the ones 
concerning the Savings & Loan Building on 
Main Street • The error there in the 
combination of things that entered into it 
showed up immediately because they had some 
beam failures. This type of thing, the 
figure or main thing that the seven-year 
period is a time test of anything that could 
be of significance. There might be some 
minor, I don't think any of us are perfect. 
When you say that anything would be perfect 
after passing a seven-year period, but we 
feel that the seven-year time test is 
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adequate to protect the public in this case 
and give repose and relief to the peaceful 
attitude of the designer who knows not now 
he's held forever for that design and can be 
brought in as part of the suit should one 
occur. Transcript of testimony before House, 
pp. 13-14, Appendix VIII. 
See also, Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647 P.2d 
276, 283 (Hawaii, 1982); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 
822 (Colo. 1982); Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 521 (Mass. 
1982); Lamb v. Wedoewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868, 882 (N.C., 
1983); McCulloch v. Fox & Jacob, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 
App. 1985). 
4. Because Buildings May Last for Literally Hundreds of 
Years a Limitation is Needed to Eliminate Perpetual Liability on 
the Part of Builders and Architects, 
During the House and Senate discussions concerning the 
bill the following statement was made by Representative Hill: 
The work that an engineer, an architect 
or contractor or supervisor performs by 
statute can be held against him for his 
entire life, and in some cases, have been 
brought against the estate of the man after 
he is deceased. . . . In this particular 
matter we have, it has been brought to our 
attention across the nation that it seems 
like we become a sue-conscious people to the 
extent that when an action is brought 
everyone that had any connection with it, 
even sometimes down to the janitor, have been 
entered into as a party to the suit. This 
has been true of many engineering firms and 
many engineering and architectural people 
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where action has been brought years and years 
after they have completed their service, the 
facility has been in use and a cause for at 
least proposed negligence has been brought 
and the person who is responsible for the 
construction of the building in the original 
instance has been named as a party to the 
suit. Usually these have been able to be 
cleared but not until much time and energy 
has been expended on the part of that person 
that was responsible for the design. House 
Hearings, pp. 5-6, Appendix VIII. 
Senator Buckner during the Senate hearings concerning 
the bill made a similar comment. He stateds 
Utah statutes today include some fifty or 
more laws that are of a limitation nature 
covering broad groups of action. However, 
there is no specific statute offering 
reasonable protection of building industry, 
contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, 
engineers or architects and they are now 
liable basically for a lifetime for these 
actions that we have been talking about. An 
action alleging liability for personal injury 
or building defects can be brought by five, 
ten, twenty, thirty, fifty, to one hundred 
years after the building basically has been 
completed. In the interest of the twenty-
five year old building, most of those 
involved with the design and construction, 
could be deceased or retired, if retired, and 
they can be completely innocent. They must, 
however, go through the expense of defending 
any action to prove their innocence at the 
time. Transcript of Hearing, p. 17. 
This problem is further illustrated in testimony given 
before the United States House of Representatives in support of 
22 
House Bill No. 4181. In a House report the following statements 
were made concerning the perpetual liability issue: 
At hearings before your Committee, 
specific cases were mentioned to illustrate 
the need for the Pending legislation. In one 
case an architectural firm designed an 
auditorium which was built in 1928. In 
1965, a visitor to the auditorium fell on the 
stairway and was injured. Her allegations in 
a suit for damages against the owner was that 
her injury was due to the improper location 
of the handrail. The owner of the building, 
in turn, filed suit against the architect for 
alleged negligence in designing the stairway 
and handrail. Thus, thirty-eight years after 
the completion of the construction the 
architectural firm is now defending itself 
against a $50,000 lawsuit. 
In another instance an engineering firm 
designed a grain elevator which was built in 
1934. The elevator was destroyed by an 
explosion in 1957. In 1959, the owner sued 
the engineer for $250,000, alleging that the 
explosion was due to errors in the design of 
the ventilation system. 
In the first case, none of the 
architects involved in the design of the 
auditorium is alive today but the 
architectural firm is being sued. Hearing 
before the United States House of 
Representatives—H.R. Bill No. 4181, House 
Report No. 91-370 as quoted in Grissom v. 
North American Aviation, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 
465, 467-8 (D.Fla. 1971). 
The Supreme Court of Nevada in State Farm Fire & 
Casualty v. All Electric, Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983) stated 
in relation to the Nevada statute of repose that the builder 
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statute's placing of a time limitation on the potential liability 
of designers and contractors "is clearly carrying out a proper 
and legitimate legislative purpose, namely, keeping such persons 
from remaining potentially liable for the lifetime of a building 
or for their own lifetime." Id. at 1001. 
5. Suits Involving Buildings Built Many Years Prior to 
Injury Create a Substantial Burden of Proof Upon the Defendants 
in Order to Defend Stale Claims Asserted Against Them. 
During the discussions concerning the bill 
Representative Hill told the House of Representatives: 
Now the fact that at some time the cut 
off should be is recognized also in the court 
because in some instances, in any kind of a 
suit, if the matter is too long past, they 
will dismiss it because it is a stale case. 
Witnesses, memories, records are so far in 
the time past that it is difficult to 
establish testimony, to establish some of the 
things that might be necessary for a court 
determination in these, and these have been 
dismissed on this fact because they ruled 
there had been as a matter of equity in 
justice no attempt to rule on those. House 
Hearings, P. 6, Appendix VII. 
The difficulty in maintaining records and witnesses was 
also noted by the Hawaii Supreme Court in reviewing the 
legislative history of its statute of repose in Shibuva v. 
Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647 P.2d 276, 283 (Hawaii 1982). The 
committee found that with claims involving architects and 
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engineers records get lost with the passage of time so that the 
basis for a defense becomes cloudy and witnesses often die or 
move away. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Rosenberg v. Town 
of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 667-68 (N.J. 1972) stated: 
There comes a time when [the defendant] 
ought to be secure in his reasonable 
expectation that the slate has been wiped 
clean of ancient obligations, and he ought 
not to be called on to resist a claim when 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, 
witnesses have disappeared. 
The Colorado Supreme Court noted this same problem when 
it stateds 
After such a long delay, as in this 
case, the proof problems in defending a 
negligence action of this kind would be very 
difficult to surmount. For example, the 
standards for architectural performance as 
well as building codes in effect could have 
changed significantly in the intervening 
years, and it would be difficult to establish 
the standard of care of a reasonably prudent 
architect at the time the design services 
were rendered in the late 1950 's. See, 
Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 
(1977). These problems, in our view, support 
the reasonableness of the legislative action. 
We are not unmindful of the fact that these 
delays also impose proof problems on the 
party asserting liability, but nevertheless 
the legislature is free to set reasonable 
restrictions so long as constitutional 
requirements are met. Yarbro v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp. . 655 P.2d 822, 826, fn. 5 
(Colo. 1983) . 
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Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico in Howell 
v. Burk. 568 P.2d 214 (N.M. 1977) recognized this problem when it 
stated: 
While both those covered and those not 
covered by the statute may be exposed to 
claims years after the construction project 
was completed, there is a difference in the 
problems of defending such claims. 
Architectural plans may have been discarded, 
copies of building codes in force at the time 
of construction may no longer be in 
existence, persons individually involved in 
the construction project may be deceased or 
may not be located. Due to the lapse of 
time, those persons covered by the statute 
may find it impossible to assert a reasonable 
defense. Id. at 220. 
6. Due to the Unique Nature of the Construction 
Industry and the Need to Promote Improvements to Real Property, 
Builders and Architects Warrant Special Protection Under the Law. 
In Salinero v. Pon, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Cal. App. 
1981) the court recognized two interrelated legitimate purposes 
to be achieved by architect's and builder's statutes of repose. 
First, the court noted that a contractor is in the business of 
constructing improvements and must devote his entire capital to 
that end. Therefore, the need to provide reserves against an 
uncertain liability extending indefinitely into the future can 
seriously impinge upon the conduct of the contractor and 
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adversely affect the construction industry. In addition, the 
court noted: 
The statutory limitation 
precluding liability for patent defect after 
a period of four years from the date of 
substantial completion of improvement to real 
property can be said to promote such 
construction since it frees those associated 
with it from the specter of lawsuits in the 
distant future. Those who fear venturing 
into such activity will be less deterred when 
a ceiling is placed on the period for which 
they can be held liable. The concept of 
promoting construction tends to harmonize 
with the public Policy favoring the full 
enjoyment and use of real Property . . . . We 
conclude that the subject statute 
promotes a recognized legitimate state 
interest by protecting contractors from 
uncertain future liability, thereby 
encouraging construction, and that a rational 
basis therefore exists . . Id. at 208. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Yarbro v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 828 also recognized that this type of 
legislation can encourage innovation and experimentation. The 
court stated: 
The Legislature could also have 
reasonably concluded that a statute limiting 
liability of architects, engineers, and other 
design professionals providing desirable 
services to improvements to real estate, 
might reasonably encourage innovation and 
experimentation. 
"Innovations are usually accompanied by 
some unavoidable risk. Design creativity 
might be stifled if architects and engineers 
labored under the fear that every untried 
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configuration might have unsuspected flaws 
that could lead to liability decades later." 
O'Brien v. Hazelet and Erdall, 299 N.W.2d 
336, 342 (Mich. 1980). 
Finally, as noted by a Senate committee in Hawaii, the 
longer the statutory period, the harder it becomes to distinguish 
between negligence in design or construction and negligence in 
maintenance. Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647 F.2d 276, 
283 (Hawaii 1982). 
7. Courts of Numerous States Have Found that the 
Preceding Policy Reasons Constitute an Economic or Social Evil 
and That the Statute of Repose is a Reasonable Means for 
Achieving the Objective. 
Xu thye judicial survey conducted by Respondent as 
contained in Appendices IV, V, and VI of this Brief, courts from 
thirty-three states have decided the constitutionality of these 
types of statutes of repose. There are presently eight states in 
which the last decision of the highest court or an intermediate 
court has held a statute of repose for architects and builders to 
be unconstitutional. See Alabama, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nevada, 
South Carolina, South Dakota and Wyoming. Of the eight states 
which presently have struck down their statutes, only three have 
done so under an open court or remedy provision which is similar 
to that of Section 11 in the Utah Constitution. See Alabama, 
South Dakota, and Wyoming. The remaining states have invalidated 
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their respective statutes based upon equal protection clauses 
(see cases from Hawaii, Nevada, and South Carolina) or upon a 
prohibition against local and special legislation (See Kentucky). 
The legislatures of seven of these eight states have 
amended the statutes that were declared unconstitutional. Only 
Alabama has failed to amend its statute subsequent to a 1983 
decision invalidating the statute. None of the amended statutes 
thus far has been held unconstitutional by any decisions 
subsequent to the original decision requiring the amendment. Of 
these eight states, the Supreme Courts of Hawaii, Nevada, and 
Oklahoma all stated that the statutes did not violate due process 
and that they constituted legitimate state objectives in 
legislation. Only the Supreme Court of Alabama in Jackson v. 
Mannesman Demag Corp., 435 So.2d 725 (Ala. 1983) held that there 
was no substantial relationship between the statute of repose and 
the eradication of the social evil it was directed against. 
The scarcity of decisions striking down these types of 
statutes, together with the efforts of the state legislatures to 
amend them in order to comply with the court requirements, shows 
a strong judicial and legislative attitude in favor of these 
types of statutes. 
On the affirmative side of the statutes of repose, 
there have been twenty-seven state court decisions upholding the 
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validity of the architect and builder statutes of repose in their 
respective states. Of this number, twenty-five have upheld it 
against attacks by federal and state due process and state open 
court and remedy provisions. (It should be noted that the state 
"open court—access-remedy" provisions are very similar to state 
and federal due Process arguments.) Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Lawrence, Dykes. Goodenberq, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362, 1367 
(6th Cir. 1984); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 
679 (Utah 1985); McGovern, supra, at 613. 
The following states have specifically upheld 
architect's and builder's statutes of repose in relation to state 
constitutional provisions similar to Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution, in terms of access to the court and remedies: 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
and Texas. 
Several states have upheld the statutes of repose on 
due process arguments nearly identical to the state 
constitutional access and remedy arguments. Those states which 
have relied exclusively upon due process and not upon the open 
court or remedy provision are as follows: California, Illinois, 
Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Wisconsin. States which 
30 
have upheld the statutes on equal protection grounds alone 
without ruling upon due process or access and remedy clauses are 
Arkansas and Washington. 
It would serve no useful purpose to quote extensively 
from these numerous opinions, since the summary contained in the 
Appendix herein attached adequately describes the basis of each 
opinion. However, several quotations from leading cases are 
helpful in supporting Respondent's argument that these types of 
statutes have a legitimate purpose and a rational basis. 
The Indiana Court of Appeals in Beecher v. White, 447 
N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983) stated: 
The reading of the voluminous 
authorities presented to us in most able 
briefs by both sides has impressed upon us 
this fact: the very fury of the debate 
between the courts of last resort of at least 
twenty-seven states, as well as some federal 
courts, militates in favor of the 
reasonableness of classification. In view of 
the fact that so many of the courts in other 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s have upheld the 
constitutionality of the acts as a 
permissible classification, it would be 
intellectual arrogance on our part to 
classify the act of our own Legislature as 
manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary. We are 
in an area where reasonable men differ on the 
wisdom of the law. The arguments presented 
in the cases upholding the constitutionality 
of these statutes are equally applicable 
here. The clear trend of the decision 
upholds such statutes. Our own Supreme Court 
has upheld similar statutes governing product 
liability and malpractice, and we believe 
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these cases indicate the correct result here. 
Id, at 627. 
In Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 524 (Mass- 1982) 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts made the following statement: 
The Legislature could have rationally 
concluded that it was proper to place 
different time limits on the liability of 
builders from those placed on persons in 
possession or control as owner, tenant, or 
otherwise. . . . Further, the Legislature 
could have reasonably concluded that it is 
appropriate to limit the liability only of 
architects and engineers and other design 
professionals. A limit on liability may be 
necessary to encourage those professionals to 
experiment with new designs and materials. . 
. . Finally, it is well recognized that "when 
legislative authority is exerted within a 
proper area, it need not embrace every 
conceivable problem within that field. The 
Legislature may proceed one step at a time, 
addressing itself to the phase of the problem 
which seems most acute to the legislative 
mind." Id. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in upholding its ten-year 
statute of repose, found that the Legislature had exercised a 
proper function in limiting these types of actions from 
litigation. The Court stateds 
It has always been considered a proper 
function of legislatures to limit the 
availability of causes of action by the use 
of statutes of limitation so long as it is 
done for the purpose of protecting a 
recognized public interest. It is in the 
interest of the public that there be a 
definite end to the possibility of future 
32 
litigation resulting from past actions. It 
is a permissible constitutional legislative 
function to balance the possibility of 
outlawing legitimate claims against the 
public need that at some definite time there 
be an end to potential litigation. Joseph v. 
Burns, 491 P.2d 203, 208 (Or- 1971). 
In conclusion, this Court should hold that the remedy-
and-access clause of the Utah Constitution is not offended by the 
architect's and builder's statute of repose. The statute 
provides an alternate remedy to an injured party by allowing that 
party to sue the owner or other party in possession. In 
addition, the statute is clearly designed to correct an economic 
and social evil of perpetual liability to building professionals. 
The utilization of the seven-year statute of repose is 
not unreasonable, and in fact is a reasonable means for achieving 
the sought-after objective. This Court, therefore, should 
affirm the lower court's judgment. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD RE-EXAMINE THE BERRY 
DECISION REGARDING THE ABILITY OF THE 
LEGISLATURE TO REGULATE THE TIME A CAUSE 
OF ACTION ARISES 
This Court in Berry decision rejected the principle 
that until a cause of action has vested, the Legislature is free 
to create a new cause of action or abolish old ones to attain 
permissible legislative objectives. This Court stated: 
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The statute, according to the [New 
Jersey] court, merely defines the time during 
which a cause of action exists. By 
definition, then, when that time expires, no 
cause of action exists and none is therefore 
abrogated. The injured party simply has no 
cause of action, and the injury done him is 
damnum absque injuria. 
We reject this view because it begs the 
question. The question, in our view, is 
whether there is a remedy by due course of 
law, and that question is not answered by 
arguing that a cause of action is not 
abrogated but is only defined to be 
temporally limited. In short, constitutional 
protection cannot be evaded by the semantic 
argument that a cause of action is not cut 
off but only defined to exist for a specific 
period of time. 717 P.2d at 679. 
Respondent is unaware of the arguments that were 
presented in the Berry case relating to the vesting of rights 
under open court provisions. The New Jersey case, for example, 
referred to by the court Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 293 
Ac 2d 662 (N.J. 1972) did not involve the interpretation of an 
open court provision. There are numerous other decisions, not 
cited by the court, which correctly address this exact issue. 
Respondent would suggest that this court should re-
examine its position in the Berry case in light of a large 
number of cases decided by other courts which hold that the 
"access" and "remedy" provisions of state constitutions do not 
prohibit a legislature from eliminating a cause of action before 
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it vests. As the Appendix attached herein shows, eighteen states 
have interpreted their open court provisions on the basis that 
the legislature is empowered to abolish common law causes of 
action in order to attain a permissible legislative objective, 
and that no vested property right exists in a plaintiff until the 
actual injury occurs. See, Appendices IV, V, and VI for 
decisions in the following eighteen states: Colorado, Delaware, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
These principles have been stated in the following 
quotations from three representatives courts. The Louisiana 
Supreme Court in Bermaster v. Gravity Drainage District No. 2, 
366 So.2d 1381 (La. 1978) stated the following: 
Where an injury has occurred for which 
the injured party has a cause of action, such 
cause of action is a vested property right 
which is protected by the guarantee of due 
process. See, Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 
326, 332, 54 S.Ct. 140, [142], 78 L.Ed. 342 
(1933); Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 
132, 1 S.Ct. 102, [108] 27 L.Ed. 104 (1882). 
However, where the injury has not yet 
occurred and that cause of action has not yet 
vested, the guarantee of due process does not 
forbid the creation of new causes of action 
or the abolition of old ones to attain 
permissible legislative objectives. See, 
Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122, 50 
S.Ct. 57 [58], 74 L.Ed. 21 (1929). Our 
jurisprudence has recognized the validity of 
legislative regulation of causes of action, 
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including replacement and even abolition, 
that one person may have against another for 
personal injuries. Id. at 1387-1388. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Lamb v. Wedgewood 
South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1983) explained its 
interpretation of a similar "remedy" provision of the state 
constitution s 
[T]he Legislature has not absolutely 
abolished all claims against builders and 
designers arising out of improvements they 
built or designed. Rather, it has 
established a time period beyond which such 
claims may not be brought even if the injury 
giving rise to the claim does not occur until 
the time period has elapsed. 
We are confident that this condition to 
the legal cognizability of a claim does not 
violate the constitutional guarantee that for 
every "injury done" there shall be a 
"remedy". The "remedy" constitutionally 
guaranteed "for an injury done" is qualified 
by the words "by due course of law. " This 
means that the remedy constitutionally 
guaranteed must be one that is legally 
cognizable. The Legislature has the power to 
define the circumstances under which a remedy 
is legally cognizable and those under which 
it is not. "The General Assembly is the 
policy making agency of our government, and 
when it elects to legislate in respect to the 
subject matter of any common law rule, the 
statute supplants the common law rule and 
becomes the public policy of the state in 
respect to that particular matter. 
McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91 
S.E.2d 231, 234 (1956). Id. at 882. 
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina then continued 
concerning a cause of action and the vesting of that cause. It 
stated: 
Furthermore, since plaintiff's cause of 
action had not accrued at the time this 
legislation was passed, no vested right is 
involved. "[N]o person has a vested right in 
a continuance of the common or statute law. 
. . . Pinkham v. Unborn Children of Jather 
Pinkham, 227 N.C. 72, 78, 40 S.E.2d 690, 694 
(1946). '[A] right cannot be considered a 
vested right unless it is something more than 
such a mere expectancy as may be based upon 
an anticipated continuance of the present 
law. . .'" IcL. at 79, 40 S.E.2d at 695 
(quoting Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 
Vol. II, p. 749); see also, Duke Power v. 
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.. 438 
U.S. 59, 88, m. 32, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2638, 
n. 32, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). We conclude, 
therefore, that the statute does not violate 
Article I, Section 18, of our State's 
Constitution. Id. at 882-883. 
Finally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Freezer 
Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715, 721 (Pa. 
1978) stated this principle: 
This Court would encroach upon the 
Legislature's ability to guide the 
development of the law if we invalidated 
legislation simply because the rule enacted 
by the Legislature rejects some cause of 
action currently preferred by the court. To 
do so would be to place certain rules of the 
"common law" and certain non-constitutional 
decisions of courts above all change except 
by constitutional amendment. Such a result 
would offend our notion of the checks and 
balances between the various branches of 
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government, and of the flexibility required 
for the healthy growth of the law. 
The preceding cases all stand for the proposition that 
under the open court Provision of the State Constitution the 
Legislature can entirely abrogate a common law right and 
therefore may certainly provide that a particular cause of action 
can no longer arise unless it accrues within a specified period 
of time. O'Brien v. Hazlett and Erdal, 299 N.w.2d 336, 341 
(Micho 1980) • And while the constitution guarantees a "remedy 
by due course of law" for "an injury done", state law "determines 
what injuries are recognized and what remedies are available." 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower 
and Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362, 1370 (6th Cir, 1984.) 
Under the analysis utilized by the courts cited in the 
Appendix, it would be unnecessary for this Court to apply the 
two-pronged test developed in Berry since this test is only 
applied by courts which do not recognize the right of the 
legislature to eliminate causes of action which are not vested. 
Respondent suggests that this court re-examine its position in 
Berry with regard to the open court provisions of the 
Constitution. 
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POINT III 
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION OR THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
POINT A 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In analyzing this case with respect to the equal 
protection clause of the Utah Constitution or the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this Court should 
apply the rational basis test. The rights asserted by Plaintiff 
herein are economical. The prayer of their complaint asks for 
money damages. This court in the case of Malan v. Lewis. 693 
P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), determined that in an action for personal 
injuries, the level of review should utilize the rational basis 
test. The Court stated at page 670: 
"Whether a statute meets equal protection 
standards depends in the first instance upon 
the objective of the statute and whether the 
classifications established provide a 
reasonable basis for promoting those 
objectives." 
This minimum level of review was again applied in the 
case of Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884 
(Utah 1988) because of the economic nature of the claim asserted 
by the Plaintiff. 
This Court should therefore apply the rational basis 
test in analyzing the statute of repose with respect to equal 
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protection laws guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
POINT B 
THE CLASSIFICATIONS CREATED BY THE STATUTE OF 
REPOSE ARE REASONABLE AND ARE REASONABLY RELATED 
TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE 
For the reasons asserted in Point IB, 1-7 the 
Respondent asserts that the classifications created by the 
statute of repose are reasonable. Furthermore, they are 
reasonably related to the achievement of the legitimate 
legislative purpose (See, Appendix VIII) 
Other Courts across the Country when presented with the 
equal protection argument have upheld the statute. In the case 
of Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d 918 (Ark. 1970) the court 
sustained a statute of repose and found that the equal 
protection clause of the State Constitution as well as the 
Federal Constitution had not been violated by limiting the 
classes of individuals subject to the protection of the statute. 
The Carter decision was appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court, which dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question. 401 U.S. 901 (1971). Numerous courts have equated the 
dismissal for lack of a federal question with a decision on the 
merits. Hartford Fire Insurance v. Lawrence, 740 F.2d 1362, 1366 
(6th Cir. 1984). 
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The Washington Supreme Court in the case of Yakima 
Fruit and Gold Storage Company v. Central Heating and Plumbing 
Company, 503 P. 2d 108 (Wash. 1973) upheld a constitutional 
attack upon the 6 year statute of repose. The court failed to 
recognize Appellant's equal protection argument and found that 
the statute did not violate the equal protection clause of the 
United States Constitution. The court further relied upon the 
Oregon Supreme Court case of Joseph v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203 (Or. 
1971). 
The Respondents agree that a few courts have struck 
down builders statutes of repose as cited in Appellant's Brief at 
page 25. Those courts, however, did not determine the issue 
based upon whether or not the classification bore a reasonable 
relationship to the achievement of the legitimate legislative 
purpose. The Hawaii Supreme Court in the case of Shibuya v. 
Architects Hawaii Ltd, 647 P.2d 276 stated a page 286 
"We are reminded, of course, that a court 
should 'not substitute its view of wise or 
fair legislative policy for that of the duly 
elected representative of the people.'" 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, at 243, 
101 S.C. 1074, at 1087, 67 L.Ed.2.d 186 
(1981). (Powell J. Dissenting), "thus, we 
hesitate to declare the legislation at issue 
is constitutionally infirm on grounds that 
it does not further legitimate state 
objectives." 
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The Hawaii Court in Shibuya determined that the question to be 
answered is whether "All persons similarly circumstanced have 
been treated alike." Id. at 286. 
In this particular case, Appellant asserts in their 
brief at page 33 "If Sanchez wins a substantial verdict against 
Little America, fully compensating his injuries, there is no need 
to appeal the lower court's dismissal. Sanchez's claim would be 
moot." Appellants therefore recognize that the full extent of 
their claim can be recovered against the owner of the property, 
Little America. In so doing, the Appellant acknowledges that the 
right of action has not been diminished. Appellant's also make 
no assertion that other plaintiffs in any other circumstances 
would be treated differently then that of the Appellant. In so 
doing, Appellant further recognizes that "all persons similarly 
circumstanced have been treated alike." Shibuya v. Architect's 
Hawaii Ltd, 647 P.2d 276, 286, (Hawaii 1982). 
This Court in applying the rational basis should 
therefore concluded, as the vast majority of other states 
appellant courts have, that the statute of repose does not 
violate the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution or 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CERTIFYING THIS CASE 
FOR APPEAL 
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Respondent agree with Appellant's assertion that 
"before the lower court can certify the claim for appeal it must 
make three findings: 
1. There must be multiple claims for relief, 
2. The Judgment appealed from must have been entered 
in an order that would be appealable, but for the fact that other 
claims or parties remained in the action; and 
3. There must be a finding that there is no just 
reason for delay of the appeal• (See, Appellant's Brief, p. 31-
32) 
Appellant claims that elements one and two are present 
in the case, but element three is not* Appellant's Brief p. 32 
The Respondents assert that there was no just reason for delay of 
the appeal and that is why the request was made to Judge Young to 
certify the matter as a final order. In this particular case, 
Plaintiff has filed separate and distinct causes of action 
against Respondent, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. (See, Second 
Amended Complaint, paragraphs 83-94). The entry of the Order of 
Summary Judgment by the lower court completely extinguished all 
the claims against this Respondent. Judge Young determined that 
there would be no just reason to make this Respondent wait around 
for possibly years to determine whether or not Sanchez wins a 
substantial verdict against Little America fully compensating him 
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for his injuries • It is also possible that Sanchez could be 
determined by a jury to be 100% negligent. In this case, as his 
testimony clearly showed, he knew how deep the pool was and that 
a reasonably prudent person would not have dived into the pool in 
his condition. 
It also seems appropriate that this matter be resolved 
in one action as there presently is an appeal pending before this 
case with respect to a third-party action brought by Little 
America Hotel against Okland Construction Company. It would 
certainly be inappropriate to require Respondent, Rocky Mountain 
Pools, Inc. to wait for Plaintiff to resolve their claims with 
Little America to have this matter determined by the Supreme 
Court, especially when this Court is now reviewing another Order 
from the District Court in this same case. 
In this case, Judge Young reviewed the facts and 
determined in his discretion "that there is no just reason for 
delay." Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 at 767 (Utah 
1984). This Court would have to find that there was an abuse of 
discretion in order to overturn Judge Young's certification. 
The Supreme Court of the United States stated in Sears, Roebuck 
Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437, 76 S.Ct. 895, 900-01 100 L.Ed. 
1297 (1957) 
The District Court cannot, in the exercise of 
its discretion, treat as "final" that which 
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is not "final".... But the District Court 
may, by the exercise of its discretion in the 
interest of sound judicial administration, 
release for appeal final decisions upon one 
or more, but less than all, claims in 
multiple claims actions. The timing of such 
release is, with good reason, vested by the 
rule primarily in the discretion of the 
District Court as the one most likely to be 
familiar with the case and with any 
justifiable reasons for delay. With equally 
good reason, any abuse of that discretion 
remains reviewable by the Court of Appeals, 
(emphasis in original) 
To require the Respondent, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. 
to wait around for however long it might take the Plaintiff to 
proceed, would be unjust and therefore Judge Young's ruling, 
pursuant to Rule 54B was appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code, Section 78-12-25.5 does not deprive 
Plaintiff of their cause of action. In fact, Plaintiff admits 
that if they win a substantial verdict against Little America, 
there will be no need to proceed against the other Defendants. 
The statute of repose therefore does not completely eliminate 
Plaintiff's claims, it only transfers the liability of such claim 
to the owner of the building. 
In this particular case, Little America Hotel 
Corporation can certainly withstand any verdict that may be 
rendered in favor of Plaint iff/Appellant. The 
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Plaintiff/Appellant has not been unfairly treated nor 
discriminated against as all persons in his class are treated 
equally as required by the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. It is clear that 
there is a strong legislative desire to enact this type of 
socially desirable legislation. 
The order was properly certified by Judge Young as a 
final order in that it would unfair and unjust to require Rocky 
Mountain Pools, Inc. to continue in the defense of this matter 
pending the outcome of Plaintiff's case against Little America 
Hotel. 
This Court should, therefore, affirm the dismissal of 
Plaintiff's cause of action against Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of April, 1989. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
attorney for Respondent 
Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. 
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1. Tort, contract, or otherwise, including actions for contribution or indemnity. 
2. Any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construct ion of such 
aa improvement; or injury to real or penonzl property caused bv anv such deficiency; or injury to 
or wrongful death of a person caused by any such deficiency. (Designated hereinafter as GEN) 
3. Substantial completion. 
4. No defense for persons in actual possession or control of such improvement, such as owner 
tenant, or otherwise. 
5. Contract (oral or written, sealed or unsealed), tort, or otherwise. 
6. Stt note 2 smpm. 
7. Substantial completion. 
8. Six years generally, but in case of injury to property or person or injury causing wrongful 
death, which occurred during sixth vear after substantial completion, ton action may be brought 
within two years after date injurv occurred, but in no event more than eight yean after substantial 
completion. 
9. Set note 4 supm. 
10. Contract (oral or written, sealed or unsealed) for property damage; tort or contract for 
personal injury or wrongful death. 
11. General statutory provisions do not specify defendants, but surveyors and persons doing 
engineering or architectural work are specifically mentioned as being included in a subsequent 
section. 
12. See note 2 *upm> 
13. Substantial completion. 
14. Five-year limitation for contract action for property damage; four-year limitation for ton 
or contract action for personal injury or wrongfai death. In case of personal injury or injury 
causing wrongful death that occurred dunng third year after substantial completion, action may be 
brought within one year after date of injury, not to extend more than five years after substantial 
completion. Time cannot be extended bv contract among the parties. 
15. Statute is tolled in the event of fraudulent concealment; no defense for person in actual 
possession or control; and no action permitted against anyone who furnishes designs or plans not 
used within three yean of furnishing. 
16. Includes surety of person in cases of latent defects. 
17. Both latent or patent deficiency in design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision 
or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to, or survey of, real property, 
injury to property, real or personal, arising out of either latent or patent denciencv; and injury to 
person or wrongful death arising out of a patent deficiency. 
18. Substantial completion. 
19. Four-vear limitation for patent deficiency; ten-vear limitation for latent deficiency. (Ton 
action may be brought within one year after date of injury arising out of patent defect that occun 
during the fourth vear after such substantial completion, irrespective of the date of death, but not 
to exceed five vean after substantial completion). 
20. Latent deficiency provisions do not apply to willful misconduct or fraudulent 
concealment. See note 4 JIUWW, which applies to both patent and latent deficiencies. Patent 
deficiency provisions do not apply to owner-occupied single-unit residences. 
21. Architect, contractor, engineer, or inspector. 
22. Injury to person or property caused bv design, planning, supervision, inspection, 
construction, or observation of construction of any improvement to real property. 
23. Statute of limitation commences when claim for relief arises. Statute of repose 
commences upon substantial completion, which is defined as decree of completion at which the 
owner can conveniently utilize the improvement for the intended purpose. 
24. Within two vean after claim arises, not to exceed ten yean after substantial completion. 
(If injury to person or property occun dunng tenth vear after substantial completion, action may 
be brought within one year after date of injury). 
25. See note 4 rupr* 
26. Contract, tort, or otherwise (includes action for con tn but ion or indemnity). 
27. Architect or professional engineer. 
28. See note 2 sue** 
29. Substantial completion (either when first used or when first available for use, whichever 
occun first). 
30. Seven yean generally, but eight yean after substantial completion when case involves 
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injury to property or penonai injury causing wrongful death, which injury occurred dunng seventh 
year alter substantial completion. 
31. See note 4 supra. 
32. Contract (oral or written, sealed or unsealed), ton, or otherwise 
33 Deficiency in construction or manner of construction of improvement to real property 
and/or m designing, planning, supervision and/or observation of such construction, injury to 
property, real, personal, or mixed, arising out of anv deiiaency, personal injuries arising out of 
deficiency, wrongful death arising out of deficiency, trespass arising out of deficiency; injury 
unaccompanied with force or resulting from deficiency 
34. Whichever of following dates shall be earliest* ia) date of purported completion as agreed 
in contract, ib) date statute of limitations commences to run in relation to particular phase of work 
provided in contract, \c) date statute commences to run in relation to contract where specified m 
contract; id) date when payment in full received by person against whom action is brought for 
particular phase in which deficiency occurred; (e) date person against whom action is brought 
received final payment in full for contract, (0 date of substantial completion, (g) date of injury for 
penonai injurv; or after period of limitations provided in contract, if contract so provides and if 
period expires pnor to expiration of two yean from whichever of foregoing dates is earliest. 
35. Set note 4 supra. Improvements do not include those made to residential property 
36 Does not apply to express or implied contract, but includes actions for contribution or 
indemnity 
37 See note 2 supra. 
38 Injury must occur within ten vean from date of substantial completion, which is defined 
as date fint used or*irst available for use after completion in accordance with contract, whichever is 
first. 
39. See note 4 supra. 
,40. Professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor 
41. Design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property 
42. Date of actual possession bv owner, date of abandonment of construction, or date of 
completion or termination of contract 
43 Except for actions involving latent defects, the four-vear statute of limitation applies. In 
cases of latent defects, twelve-year statute of repose applies 
44 Discovery is permitted to allow the plaintir? to uncover latent defects 
45. Deficiency in survey, planning, design, specifications, supervision or observation of 
construction, or construction of improvement to real property, injury to property, real or personal, 
arising c .t of deficiency, injury to person or wrongful death arising out of deficiency 
46. Substantial completion (defined as date when construction was sufficiently completed in 
accordance with the contract, as modified by any change agreed to by the parties, so that the owner 
could occupy the project for the intended use) 
47 Eight vean generally, but in case of injury to person or property or injury causing 
wrongful death, which injury occurred dunng seventh or eighth vear after substantial completion, 
tort action mav be brought within two yean after date of injury, not to exceed ten vean from date 
of substantial completion. 
48. See note 4 supra. 
49. Owner of real property or other person having an interest therein or in improvement, or 
against person constructing, altering, or repairing improvement, or manufacturing or furnishing 
materials incorporated in improvement, or performing or furnishing services m connection with 
improvement 
50. See note 2 supra. 
51 VVuhm two vean of acquisition, not to exceed six vean after date of substantial 
completion or abandonment of improvement unless injurv occurs in fifth or sixth year after date of 
completion, if so, action must be brought within two vean of injury, but in no event more than 
aght vean after date of completion. 
52. U 
53. Does not aoplv to actions tor damages against owner or other person having interest in 
real property or improvement based on negligent conduct in repair or maintenance of 
improvement, or to actions against surveyors for erron in boundary surveys. 
54 Contract or tort. 
55. See note 2 supra. 
56, fa) Ton actions accrue and statute commences to run six yean after final completion of 
construction, (b) contract actions accrue and statute commences to run at tune of final completion 
of construction 
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57. Applies only to ton actions that do noc accrue within six vears after final completion of 
construction. 
58. Sue rune 4 suprm. 
59. Won or service on real property or any product incorporated therein to become pan of 
real property that does noc cause injury or propeny damage within six years after performance, 
manufacture, assembly engineering, or design. 
60. If no injury or damage within ux-year period, there is presumptive proof of reasonable 
care by person doing any of the said acts. 
61. All written guarantees. 
62. Contract, ton, nuisance, or otherwise. 
63. Set note 2 sup**. 
64. Set note 3 supra. 
65. Contract or ton. 
66. Set note 2 supra, 
67. Substantial completion denned as date when owner first occupied or commenced use. 
68. Five yean generally, but in case of injury to property or person or wrongful death from 
injury, which injury occurred dunng fifth year after substantial completion, action may be brought 
within one year from date injury occurred, not to exceed six years after substantial completion. 
69. See note 4 supra. 
70. Ex-contractu, ex-delicto, or otherwise. 
71. Deficiency in design, planning, supervision, inspection or observation of construction, or 
in construction of an improvement to immovable propeny; damage to propeny, movable or 
immovable, zrvung out of deficiency; action against a person for action or omission o( employees. 
72. Ten vean after (1) date of registry in mongage office of acceptance bv owner; or (2) if no 
such acceptance filed within ux months of dace owner occupies or takes possession, then after 
occupation bv owner 
73. In cases of injury to property or person or wrongful death that occun dunng runth year of 
ten-vear penod, action mav be brought one year after date of injury, noc to exceed eleven /ears 
74. Set note 4 supra. \r»y cause of action existing prior to Julv 29, 1964 will not be preempted 
until July 29, 1965 or bv the provision established in this statute, whichever is later. 
75. Licensed or registered architects or engineers. 
76. Professional negligence or malpractice. 
77 Four vean after discovery of malpractice or negligence, not to exceed ten yeans alter 
substantial completion of construction contract or substantial completion of services, if no 
construction contract involved. 
78. Set note 77 supra. 
79. Not applicable if parties have entered into valid contract which provides for different 
limitation penods. 
30. Specifically includes actions for contribution or indemnity 
81. Architects or professional engineers are given special treatment but all persons are covered 
by general provision. 
82. Set note 2 supra. 
83. Entire improvement became available for mten6ed use, 
84 Three yean from dace of injurv but noc more than twenty vears after availability, except 
that actions against architects or professional engineen must be brought within ten years. 
85. Set note 4 supra. 
86. Ton. 
87. Deficiency or neglect in design, planning, construction, or general administration of 
improvement to real property 
88. Three vean after cause of action accrues, noc to exceed six vears after performance or 
furnishing of design, planning, construction, or general administration. 
89. State-licensed architect, professional engineer, or land surveyor, including an individual, 
corporation, pannership, or business entity on behalf of whom architect, engineer, or surveyor is 
performing or directing performance of architectural, engineering, or surveying service. 
90. Set note 2 supra. 
91. Time of occupancy of completed improvement, use of acceptance of such improvement 
(for surveyors, at time of delivery of repon). 
92. See note 4 supra. 
93. See note 2 supra. 
94. Set note 46 supra. 
95. See note 47 supra. 
96. Cases involving fraud or breaches of statutory warranties 
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97 Injurv to real or personal property, injury to person, or wrongful death, arising out of 
oatent denaencv tn design, planning, supervision, or obaervauon of construction or construction of 
approvement to real property. 
96. Written acceptance of construction by owner. 
99. No action for contribution or indemnity unless there was a prior written agreement 
providing for such action. Limitation does not apply to persons in actual possession and control for 
which it is proposed to bring an action as heretofore controlled by other statutes or the Laws of the 
state regarding ton or negligence actions. 
100. Tort, including contribution and indemnify. 
tOI. .Architects, engineers, or builden of defective improvements to real properry where sole 
connection with improvement ts performing or furnishing in whole or in pan the design, planning, 
or construction of improvement. 
102. Set note 2 supra 
103. Date of completion of improvement. 
104. Set note 4 supra Does not apply where defendant mortal* defect or deficiency that 
directly caused the detective or unsafe condition. 
105 Excluding actions upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon a written 
instrument 
106. Damages resulting from or arising out of design, planning, supervision, inspection, 
construction, or observation of construction, or of Land-surveying performed in connection with 
improvement to real property. 
107. Completion of improvement (degree o( completion at which owner can utilize 
improvement for intended purpose or when completion certificate is executed, whichever is earlier). 
108. Ten vean generally, but action for injury that occurred during tenth year after 
completion mav be commenced within one year after injury occurred. 
109. Breach of warranty of improvements to real property, or deficiency in design, planning, 
supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of improvement to real property. 
110. Act or omission giving rtse to action. 
111. Within four vean, unless breach of warranty or deficiency is not or could not be 
reasonably discovered within five years. In that instance, two years from discovery, but for breach 
of warranty, not more than ten vears after act or omission. 
112. Ton, contract, or otherwise. 
113. Set note 2 supra. 
114. See note 3 supra. 
115. Six vean in all cases, except for action for injury to properry or person, or wrongful death, 
in which case action mav be brought witrun one year after date of injury, not to exceed seven years 
after substantial completion of improvement. 
116. Set note 4 supra. 
117. Including contribution indemnity. 
118. St* note 2 supra. 
119. Performance or furnishing of services and construction. 
120. Set note 4 supra. 
121. Contract, ton, or otherwise, including contribution or indemnity. 
122. See note 2 supra. 
123. See note 3 supra. 
124. See note 4 supra 
125. See note \ 17 supra. 
126. See note 2 supra. 
127. Substantial completion (date construction surrkiently completed so that property can be 
used for intended purpose, or date owner occupies or uses, or date established by contractor, 
whichever occurs last). 
128. Not applicable to action based on contract, warranty, or guarantee expressly inconsistent 
with statute. See <U.J note 4 supra. 
129. See note \\7 supra 
130. See note 2 supra. 
131. Performance or furnishing of services and construction. 
132. Set note 4 supra. 
133. Contract (oral or written, sealed or unsealed), ton or otherwise. 
134. See note 2 supra. 
135. See note 3 supra 
136. Ten vean generally, but in case of injury to properry or person, or wrongful death from 
injury, which injury occurred during tenth year after substantial completion, ton action may be 
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brought within two years after date of injury, not to exceed twelve years after substantial 
completion. 
137. Set note 4 supra. 
138. Set note 2 supra. 
139. Performance or furnishing of services and construcuoo. 
140. Set note 4 supra. 
141. Ton. 
142. Includes any penon owning, leasing, or in posse mon of improvement, or performing or 
furnishing the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction. 
143. Set note 2 supra. 
144. Set note 3 supra. 
145. Injury to person or properrv arising from another person having performed construcuoa, 
alteration or repair of improvement to real property, or supervision or inspection thereof, or from 
furnishing design, planning, surveying, architectural, or engineering services. 
146. Two >ears from date of injury, noc to exceed ten years from substantial compleuoo 
(written acceptance of improvement, or, if none, date of acceptance of construction, alteration, or 
repair). 
147. See note 4 supra. 
148. See note 2 supra. 
149 Completion of construction. 
150. Twelve years, except in cases of injury or wrongful death occurring between tea and 
twelve years after completion, where action may be commenced within the time otherwise provided 
but noc later than fourteen vears after completion. 
151. Possible discovery bv reasonable extension of General State Auth. v. Lawne k Green, 24 
Pa. Commw Ct. 407, 356 A2d 851 (1976). 
152. See note 4 supra. 
153. Ton, including arbitration proceedings, and contribution or indemnity 
154. Architect, professional engineer, contractor, subcontractor, or materialman. 
155. Set note 2 supra. 
156. See note 3 supra. 
157. Architects, professional engineers, or contractors. 
158. Deficiency in design, planning, supervision, observation of construction, construction of or 
surveying in connection with improvement to real property; injury to property, real or personal, 
arising out of deficiency; injury to penoex or wrongful death arising out of deficiency 
159. Substantial completion defined as "when useable for intended purpose,"* but may be 
established bv written agreement between contractor and owner 
160 Ten years after substanuai completion, except in cases of injury to properrv or penon, or 
wrongful death, which injury occurred during ninth or tenth vear after substantial completion, 
action may be brought within two years after date of injury, not 10 rscrrd twelve years after 
substanuai completion. 
161. Provisions of any guarantee, bonds, or other similar instruments or agreement of parties 
for the bringing of any action. Not available to person guilty of fraud m performance or of 
concealing a cause of action. Set aim note 4 supra. 
162. See note 2 supra. 
163 Substantial completion (date construction sufficiently completed for occupation or 
intended use). 
164. Six years, except in cases involving injury to properrv or person, which injury occurred 
during sixth year after substanuai completion, or death, action may be brought within one year of 
date of injury, not to exceed seven vears. 
165. See note 4 supra. 
166. Deficiency in design, planning, supervision, observation of construction, construction of or 
surveying in connection with improvement to real property; injury to property, real or personal, 
arising out of deficiency; injury to person or wrongful death arising out of deficiency. 
167. See note 3 supra. 
168. Four vears, except where mjurv to property or person, which injury causes wrongful 
death, occurs during fourth vear after substantial completion, then action may be brought within 
one year after date of injury, not to exceed five vears. 
169 See note 117 supra. 
170. Registered or licensed engineer or architect, and anyone performing or furnishing 
construction or repair or improvement to real property 
171. Injury, damages, or loss to real or personal property, injury to person or wrongful death 
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truing out of defective or unsafe condition of real property, equipment, or improvement attached 
thereto 
172. Se* note 3 sup**. 
173. Ten vears after substantia] completion; two vears from date of injury, loo, damage, or 
death where such occurs dunng tenth year after substantia] completion. 
174. There is a rwo»vear extension from time written claim is presented to potential defendant 
if presented within ten years of substantial completion. Statucc will not apply to a suit on a written 
warramy, guarantee, or other contract that expressly is effective for a greater period, or an action 
based on willful misconduct or fraudulent concealment. Se* *is* note 4 supr*. 
173. See note 2 supra. 
176 Completion of construaion (date of issuance of certificate of substantia] completion, or 
date of owner s use or possession). 
177 St* note 4 Apr* 
178. S*r note 117 suprm. 
179 St* note 2 supra. 
180 Performance or furnishing of services and construction. 
181 Manufacturer or supplier of equipment or articles installed upon real property See ais* 
note 4 supra. 
182. All claims arising out of construction, alteration, or repair of improvement upon real 
propenv, including*design, planning, surveying, architectural or construaion or engineering 
KTvices, supervision or observation of construction, or administration of construaion contracts 
183 Substantial completion, or termination of services, whichever is later (substantial 
completion defined as time improvements mav be used for intended purpose) 
184 Time allowed under applicable statute of limitation, or six years for substantial 
completion or termination of services, whichever is Later. 
185 See note 4 supra. 
186. Injurv to property or person, bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of defective and 
unsafe condition of improvement to real property, including design, surveying, planning, 
supervision, supplying materials, or construaion 
187 Substantial completion 
188. Extension of six months where injury or defea occurs or is discovered between five and six 
years after substantial completion 
189 Ton, contract, or otherwise. 
190 See note 2 supra. 
191. Substantial completion (degree of completion at which utilization of improvement for 
intended use is possible) 
192. Ten vears generally, but if the injury to property or person causes death and occurs 
dunng ninth year after substantial completion, action may be brought within one year after date of 
injury 
193. See note 4 supra. 
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CHART III 
Medical Malpractices Statutes of Repose 
Legal Subject Commence- Consn-
Theory Defendants Matter mem Length tuuonaltcy Lxcrpitptm 
AL 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DC 
FL 
CA 
H! 
ID 
IL 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
MD 
MO 
MT 
NB 
NV 
NH 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OR 
SC 
SO 
TN 
UT 
VT 
W A 
S» 
N 
S" 
N 
S-* 
S 2 6 
N 
s 
N 
S4* 
N 
X " 
• N 
S 6 l 
N 
N 
N 
.V 
N 
S** 
S*> 
X** 
N 
N 
N 
V 
s 
$120 
S123 
5128 
N 
N 
S* 
S7 
S»* 
S » 6 
$21 
S 2 7 
S3* 
S ^ 
SJ* 
S4* 
S 4 9 
s* 
s* 
S * 2 
S** 
S*9 
s74 
N7« 
S«» 
S<* 
S*» 
V 9 6 
N I 0 0 
S104 
Sios 
N 
S J I 6 
S I 21 
N 
S ' » 
N 
S i 3 * 
S-» 
S« 
S»3 
S>7 
s» 
• s» 
SJ2 
S * 
S4* 
S4* 
s*> 
s" 
S i 9 
S * 3 
s« 
s:o 
S " 
S7* 
S « 
S«7 
S 9 2 
S 9 7 
S101 
5103 
5t09 
S l . 3 
S I I 7 
S l 2 2 
N 
5IX) 
S i 3 3 
S i 3 7 
X* 
x* 
X ' 4 
x»« 
X 2 3 
X » 
X " 
X " 
X 4 1 
x4* 
x»> 
x * 
x*0 
x*4 
x«7 
X 7 ' 
X7* 
X 8 0 
X " 
x« 
X 9 3 
X9 8 
X»02 
X ' 0 6 
X H 0 
X 1 1 4 
X t l 8 
X 123 
X >?6 
X t 3 t 
X I 3 4 
X 1 3 8 
324 
4/730 
2/10 7* 
4 / 1 0 ' 0 3 
4 U 1 
3 
X* 
Yes 
X4 7 
Y« 
Yet 
X7 3 
Ye. 
Ye* 
Y e i 
X* 
X I O 
X»* 
X I 9 
X 2 3 
X34 
x» 
X 4 2 
X4 8 
x» 
X " 
x« 
X77 
X*4 
X** 
X 9 4 
X " 
X«07 
X U 2 
X l , 3 
X I I 9 
X1 2 4 
X»27 
X I 3 2 
X I 3 3 
X l 3 9 
Code S - Specified 
N - Not Spoofed 
G - Gcncrai 
1. Contract or tort. 
2. Physicians, surgeons, dentists, medical institutions, or other health care providers. 
3. Liability, error, mistake, or failure to cure. 
4. Act or omission giving rue to claim. 
5. Constitutionality is suspect; pnor statute before amendment held unconstitutional. 
6. Minor under four years old has until eighth birthdav Any error, mistake, act, omission, 
or failure to cure that gave rise to a daun and accrued be/ore September 23, 1973 cannot be barred 
be/ore September 23, 1976. 
7. Health care provider defined as licensed or certified person, dime, health dispensary, or 
health facility, including legal representatives of a health care provider. 
8. Professional negligence defined as negligent act or omission to act that is the proximate 
cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such acts are within the scope o£ services 
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for which the provider u licensed and are not within any restncuon imposed by the licensing 
agency or licensed hospital 
9 Date of injury 
10 Statute is toiled upon proof of fraud, intentional concealment, or presence of foreign 
object in person Actions on behalf of minor under six yean shall be commenced within three veaxi 
or prior to eighth birthday, whichever provides a longer period 
11 Ton or contract 
12 Licensed hospital, health care facility, dispensary, or other institution for treatment of sack 
or injured or anv person licensed in mediane, chiropracucs, physical therapy, podiatry, veterinary 
medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry, nursing, or other healing arts. 
13 As to institutions, negligence, or breach of contract in providing care, lack of providing 
care, or lack of informed consent Individuals also are liable for actions based on failure to posses 
or exercise that dc^nt of skill actually or impliedly represented, promised, or agreed that they 
possess and would exercise 
14 Act or omission that gives nat to claim 
15 Statute does not apply if defendant knowingly conorali act or omission, or if the action is 
based on the leaving of an unauthorized foreign object in the patient's body Minors under six 
have until age eight to bnng suit Tune does not run against minors under eighteen who do not 
have a natural or legal guardian, such persons have two yean from appointment of guardian or 
eighteenth birthday to commence action 
16 Phvsiaan. surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital, or sanitarium 
17 Negligence, reckless or wanton misconduct, or malpractice. 
18 Date of the act or omission 
19 A counterclaim may be interposed at any time before the pleadings in such action are 
finallv closed 
20 Ton or breach of contract 
21 Health care provider 
22 Health care malpractice resulting in personal injury or death 
23 Date upon which injury occurred 
24 Action for personal injury only must be brought within three yean of date injury 
occurred, and onlv if during the first two vean the injury was unknown and could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
25 Minors under six have three yean from injury or until sixth birthday, whichever is longer, 
to bring suit 
26 Contract or tort 
27 Provider of health care, pnviry required 
28 Death, injury, or monetary loss arising out of medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, 
treatment, or care, 
29 Date of incident or occurrence out of which cause of actsoo accrued 
30 If fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation prevent discovery within four-year 
limit, period is extended two yean forward from discovery, but in no event is to exceed seven yean 
from incident 
31 Persons authorized bv law, or othen acting under the supervision and control o( such 
lawfully authorized persons and hospitals, nursing homes, clinics, hospital authorities, facilities or 
institutions. 
32 Claims for damages resulting from death of, or injury to, any person, arising out of health, 
medical, dental, or surgical service, diagnosis, prescription, treatment, or cure 
33 Date upon which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred. 
34 Does not apply if a foreign object has been left in a patient s body 
35 Chiropractor, clinical laboratory technician, dentist, naturopath, nurse, nursing home 
administrator, dispensing optician, optometrist, osteopath, phvsiaan, surgeon, physical therapist, 
podiatrist psvchologxst, or vetennanan licensed by state, or licensed hospital as the employer of any 
nich person 
36 Professional negligence, rendering services without consent, error, or omission. 
3? Date of the alleged act or omission causing injury or death. 
38 Limitation is toiled for any period during whjch defendant has Called to discloar any act, 
error or omission which u known to him. 
39 Provision is contained in general statute for all professional malpractice, but hospitals, 
physicians, or other persons or institutions practicing any of the healing arts are specified in an 
exception for foreign objects. 
40 Damages for professional malpractice, for an injury to the person, or for the death of one 
caused by wrongful act or neglect of another 
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41 Time of the occurrence, act, or omission complained of (limitation penod snail not be 
extended bv reason o( anv continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom, or by any 
continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged 
wrongdoer) 
42. Does not aoplv to actions based on foreign objects left in patient's body, or if wrongdoer 
has fraudulently and knowingly concealed facts from the injured party. 
43. Tort, breach of contract, or otherwise. 
44 Anv phvsician or hospital duly licensed under laws of state. 
45. Action for damages for injury or death arising out of patient care. 
46. Date upon which the act. omission, or occurrence alleged in such action to have been 
cause of injury or death occurred. 
47 There is split of authority in intermediate appellate courts. Gmpmt Woodward v 
Burnham City Hosp, 60 III App 3d 285, 377 N E.2d 290 (1978) (four-year repose violates state 
constitution bv constituting special legislation) untA Anderson v Wagner, 79 UL App. 2d 295, 402 
N.£.2d 560 M979) (four-vear repose does not violate state constitution). 
48. Under eighteen, insane, mentaJlv ill, or imprisoned on criminal charges; penod of 
limitations does not run until disability is removed. 
49 Licensed phvsician and surgeon, osteopath, osteopathic physician and surgeon, dentist, 
podiatrist, optometrist, pharmacist, chiropractor, nurse, or licensed hospital. 
50 Personal injurv or wrongful death arising out of patient care 
51 Date upon which the act, omission, or occurrence alleged to have been the cause of injury 
or death occurred 
52. Cases in which foreign object left in body caused injury or death are subject TO limitations. 
53. Excepts actions arising from contract. 
54 A health care provider is defined as one who is licensed to practice any branch of healing 
arts, one who holds a temporary permit to practice any branch of healing arts, or one who is 
engaged in postgraduate program approved by state board of healing arts, a licensed medical care 
facility, a health maintenance organization, a licensed dentist, a licensed professional nurse, a 
licensed practical nurse, a licensed optometrist, a registered podiatrist, a professional corporation 
authorized to provide health care, a registered pharmacist, or a registered physical therapist 
55 Rendering of, or failure to render, professional services. 
56 Act giving rise to the cause of action 
57 Person under eighteen years of age, incapacited, or imprisoned for a term less than life 
must bnng action withm one year after disability is removed, but in any case no more than eight 
years bevond time of act giving rise to cause of action 
58 Phvsician, surgeon, dentist, or licensed hospital. 
59 Negligence or malpractice 
60. Date on which negligent act or omission is said to have occurred. 
61 Tort, contract, or otherwise 
62. Physician, chirooractor. dentist, or licensed hospital. 
63. Arising out of patient care 
64. Date of alleged act. omission, or neglect. 
65 "Health care provider* includes hospitals, related institutions, physaaans, osteopaths, 
optometrists, registered or licensed practical nurses, dentists, podiatrists, and physical therapists. 
66. Action for damages for injury arising out of rendering of or failure to render professional 
services bv health care proviaer 
67 Date injury was committed 
68. For minors under the age of sixteen, tune commences to run at sixteenth birthday 
69 Physicians, hospitals, dentists, registered or licensed practical nurses, optometrists, 
podiatrists, pharmacists, chiropractors, professional physical therapists, and any other entity 
providing health care services, and employees of foregoing acting us course and scope o( 
employment 
70. Malpractice, negligence, error, or mistake related to health care, special provision for 
introducing and negligently permitting any foreign object to remain within the body of a living 
person. 
71. Date of act of neglect giving rise to cause of action. 
72. Section has two repose Limitations. With the exception of cases involving foreign objects, 
action must be brought within two vean of act or omission, regardless of when injury occurs. 
Actions for foreign objects must be filed within ten yean of act or omission. 
73 Prior statute upheld in Laughlin v Forgrave, 432 S.W 2d 308 (Mo. 1968). 
74. Phvsician. surgeon, dentist, registered nurse, nursing home administrator, dispensing 
optician, optometrist, licensed pnvsical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, osteopath, chiropractor. 
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clinical laboratory bioanalvst, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, veterinarian, licensed 
ho»p»tal, or long term care facility as employer of any such person. 
75 Injury or death arising out of alleged professional negligence, error, or omission, or for 
rendering service without consent 
76 Date of mjurv 
77 Limitation a tolled for anv period dunng which health care provider failed to disclose act, 
error, or omission upon which action is based and which is known, or which would have been 
known through use of reasonable diligence. 
78 General statute covering all professionals. 
79 Rendering or failure to render professional services, or breach of warranty 
80 Date of rendering or failure to render professional service that is basis for cause of action. 
81 "Provider of health care'* includes licensed phvsiaan, dentist, jegnicicd nurse, dispensing 
optician, optometrist, registered physical therapist, podiatrist, licensed psychologist, chiropractor, 
doctor of traditional Oriental medicine, medical laboratory director or technician, or licensed 
hospital as employer of any such person 
82 Professional negligence, professional services rendered without consent, error, or oouaooo 
resulting in personal mjurv or death 
83 Date of injury 
84 Limitation tolled for period during which health care provider has concealed any act, 
error, or omission upon which action is based and which u or should have been known to him. 
Minors are excepted from the statute only in case of brain damage or birth defect (until age ten) or 
sterility (two yean from discovery of condition) 
85 Ton, contract, or otherwise 
86 Phvsiaan, physician's assistant, registered or licensed practical nurse, hospital, dime, or 
not-for-profit home health care agency licensed by the state or otherwise lawfully providing medical 
care or services. 
87 Actions for adverse, untoward, or undesired consequences arising out of or sustained in 
the course of professional services rendered failure to diagnose, premature abandonment of a 
patient or of a course of treatment, or failure to maintain properly equipment or appliance 
necessary to render professional services 
88 Act. omission, or failure complained of 
89 Actions based on discovery of a foreign object in the body of the injured person Minors 
under eight vears have until their tenth binhdav 
90 Tort or contract 
91 Doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of osteopathy, 
chiropractor, podiatrist nurse anesthetist, or phvsiaan s assistant 
92 Medical treatment, lack of medical treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted 
standards of health care that proximately results in injury to patient. 
93 Date of act of malpractice 
94 Minors under six vears have until their ninth birthday 
95 Statute is broadly worded 
96 Bv case law does not include dentist 
97 Act, omission, or failure 
98 Time of the act, omission, or failure complained of, or date of the last treatment in cases of 
continuous treatment for the same illness 
99 Actions based on the discovery of a foreign object in patient's body 
100 Ccncrzi statute covering ail profasionMli. 
101 Causes of action for maipractice arising out of the performance of or failure to perform 
professional services. 
102 Last act of defendant giving nse to cause of action 
103 Ten-vear limitation applies to actions involving foreign objects left in body; four-year 
limitation applies to all other actions. 
104 Phvsiaan or licensed hospital 
105 Act or omission 
106 Date of act or omission of alleged malpractice. 
107 Exception if discovery was prevented bv fraudulent conduct of phvsiaan or hospital. 
State statute on disabilities, extending limitations on filing actions, apply 
108 "Hospital" includes any person, corporation, association, board, or authority responsible 
for operation of any hospital licensed or registered in state. "Phvsiaanw includes all persons 
licensed to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery by state medical 
board 
109 Diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person 
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110. Date of act constituting malpractice. 
111. Civil action for nonconsensual abortion must be commenced within one yea* after the 
abortion* 
112. A minor under ten yean of age has until fourteenth birthday to commence ar^^^ 
Written notice, prior to expiration of specified time penod. given to any person involved ia * 
medical malpractice case bv plaintiff, indicating that plaintiff is considering bringing an action 
extends time period one hundred and eighty days after notice is given. 
113. Medical, surgical, or dental treatment, omission, or operation resulting in personal injury 
114. Date of treatment, omission, or operation upon which action is based. 
US. If no action is commenced within five years due to fraud, deceit, or misleadiat 
representation, action may be brought within two years from date that fraud, deceit, or 
representation is discovered or should have been discovered. 
116. Licensed health care provider. 
117. Treatment, omission, or operation giving rue to personal injury. 
118. Date of occurrence. 
119. Applies only to causes of action that arose after June 10, 1977. If there is fraudulent 
concealment by defendant, or a foreign object has negligently been left in a patient's body, plaintiff 
has one year from date of discovery. 
120. Contract or tort. 
121. Physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital, sanitarium, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, 
chiropractor, or other practitioner of the healing arts. 
122. Malpractice, trror% mistake, or failure to cure. 
123. Time of alleged malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure. 
124. Exception for filing counterclaim if cause was not barred at the time the suit was 
originated. 
125. Contract or tort. 
126. Date upon which negligent act or omission occurred. 
127. If there is fraudulent concealment by defendant, or a foreign object has negligently been 
left in a patient's body, plaintiff has one year from discovery. 
128. Action in contract, ton, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon 
alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out oi health care. 
129. "Health care provider" includes anv person, partnership, association, corporation, or 
other facility or institution that causes to be rendered or that renders health care of professional 
services as a hospital, phvsician. registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, 
dental hvgientst, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, 
podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician and 
surgeon, audiologist, speech pathologist, certified social worker, social service worker, social service 
aide, marriage and family counselor, or practitioner of obstetrics, and others rendering similar care 
and services, including officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in course and scotx 
of employment. 
130. Act, omission, neglect, or occurrence giving rise to personal injuries. 
131. Date of alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. 
132. .Actions in which plaintiff alleges that defendant wrongfully left a foreign object in the 
patients body, or the defendant affirmatively acted fraudulently to conceal the alleged omission. 
133. Medical or surgical treatment or operation giving roe to personal injury. 
134. Date o( the incident. 
133. No repose limitation if fraudulent concealment has prevented the patient's discovery o( 
the negligence, or if a foreign object in the patient's body is noc discovered. There is a speanc 
section for injury due to ionizing radiation (twenty-year repose penod). Toiling oi statute for 
persons under a legal disability is noc affected. 
136. Includes, but is not limited to, a physician, osteopathic physician, dentist, nurse 
optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, psychologist, pharmacist, optician, 
physician's assistant, osteopathic physician's assistant, nurse practitioner, physician's trained mobile 
intensive care paramedic, or an empiovee or agent of above, acting in course. and scope of 
employment; or an entity, facility, or institution, including, but not limited to, a hospital, clinic, 
health maintenance organization, or nursing home, or an officer, director, employee or agent 
thereof, acting in course and scope of employment. 
137. Professional negligence, act, or omission. 
138. Date of act or omission. 
139. Does not apply to persons under legal disability, or to services provided before June 2* 
1976. 
140. General statute of limitation. 
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141. Damages for injuria to person. 
142. Tunc of such injury. 
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CHART IV 
Product Liability Statutes of Repose* 
C M M M B M K «r Ofcar Gomptecc PrcBwoipnve E/beme 
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S2 
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s« 
S2« 
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c 
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G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
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G 
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8 
11 
10 
12 
10 
10 
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3 
10 
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S 
to 
8 
10 
to 
6 
to* 
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If/" 
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tao 
12« 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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X " 
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X " 
x> 
X 1 0 
x»4 
X 1 9 
X 2* 
x» 
X* 1 
x«° 
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x*> 
X*> 
X " 
X 6 0 
x*« 
X* 7 
x7» 
X 7 4 
X7 7 
X* ' 
X " 
X*9 
X* 
X 2 * 
x » 
X « 
x«» 
x * 
X * 
x*» 
X<* 
X* 2 
Code: S - Specified 
N - Not Specified 
D - Defined 
G «• General 
This chart only includes states which have enacted statutes of repose specifically for product liability actions. 
Some nates have reneral statutes of repose thai wouid apply to such actions, or have provuions that may have 
umtiar impact. For aMtnpke* Michigan law denses tike puuncuf the benefit of any presumption in proving a 
prima (aoe case in acuona in watch a product has been in use Aw ieas than ten years. 
1. Bases of action limited to negligence, innocent or negligent misrepresentation, the manu-
facturer's liability doctrine, tbc Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, breach of 
implied warranty, or breach of oral express warranty Eliminated by omission are intentional mis-
representation and breach of express written warranty 
2. Original seller, meaning any person, firm, corporation, association, partnership, or other 
legal or business entity selling or distributing manufactured product; excludes those who acquired 
manufactured product for resale or distribution in unused condition or as component of unused 
product to be sold in unused condition. 
3. Actions limited to those ansing from manufactured products. 
4. Action must be brought within ten yean after federal or state governmental agency has 
imposed requirement to alter, repir, recall, inspect, or issue wmnungt about product, and injury or 
disease has resulted from original seller's failure to comply. 
5. July 30, 1979 (no retroactive application). 
6. Bv written agreement, original seller expressly may waive or extend limitation in statute. 
7. All legal theories, except limitation, do not apply to actions based on negligence or breach 
of express warranty by manufacturer or teller. 
8. Manufacturer defined as a person or enory who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, 
constructs, or prepares product or component prior to sale; seller includes wholesaler, distributor, 
retailer, or lessor. 
9. An individual product or component part of a product. 
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10. September 3, 2978 (applicable oniy to causes of action accruing alter this date). 
11. Action may be brought regardless of legal theory, except that no action based on stria 
liability in tort may be brought against seller unless seller is also manufacturer of product. 
12. Manufacturer or seller, if seller had actual knowledge of the defect, furnished specifica* 
tions relevant to the alleged defect, exercised some significant control over the manufacturing pro* 
^ ^ ygnihcantlv altered product before sale, or is owned bv manufacturer. 
13. Ten yean after the date the product was sold for use or consumption, it shall be rebut-
ubly presumed that product was not defective, manufacturer or seller was not negligent, and all 
warnings and instructions were proper and adequate. 
14. July 1, 1977. 
15. Includes, but is not limited to, strict liability in tort, negligence, expressed or implied 
breach of warranty, breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent 
or innocent misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 
16. Product sellers, including manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, or retailers engaged in 
the business of selling products, whether the saie is (or resale, use, or consumption; lessors or bailors 
of products. 
17. Product or component pan of product, whether for sale, use, or resale; privity not 
required. 
18. Action must be brought within ten yean from date defendant last parted with pnatriiion 
or control of product. 
19 All actions brought on or before October 1, 1979. 
20. Ten-year limit snail not apply to claimant who is not entitled to compensation under 
Chapter 568, provided such claimant can prove that harm occurred during useful safe life of 
product. 
21 % Statute of repose declared unconstitutional. Battilia v. Allis Chalmen Mfg. Co., 392 So. 
2d 874 (Fla. 1980). Limitation mav be extended by terms of any express written warranty that the 
product can be used for more than ten yean. 
22. Manufacturer or seller of a product. 
23. Twelve yean from date of delivery of completed product to original purchaser, or twelve 
years from date of commission of alleged fraud, regardless of date of discovery of defect or fraud. 
24 Applicable only to causes of actions accruing on or after October 1, 1978. 
25. Ton or contract. Abrogates pnviry requirements for ton actions; confines actions for 
breach of duty under contract to actions in contract. 
26. Manufacturers of personal property sold as new property. 
27. Personal property sold as new property. 
28. Effective July 1, 1978. 
29. Speahcallv prohibits manufacturers from excluding or limiting operation of statute. 
30. Product sellers (person or entity), including lesson, bailors, and manufacturen. 
31. Objects possessing intnnsic value, capable of delivery, and produced for introduction into 
trade or commerce. 
32. From delivery (but not more than the useful safe life of the product). 
33 In claims that involve harm caused more than ten yean after delivery, a presumption 
anses that the harm was caused after the useful safe life had expired. This presumption may be 
rebutted only bv clear and convincing evidence. 
34. July 1, 1980. 
35. Statutes of repose inapplicable: for express warranties providing for greater period; for 
intentional misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of information; for claims for contribution 
or indemnity; if the harm was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product; if the injury-
causing aspect of the product that existed at the time of delivery was not discoverable by an ordi-
nary, reasonably prudent person until more than ten yean after the tune of delivery; or, if the 
harm, caused within ten yean after the time of delivery, did not manifest itself until after that time. 
36. Strict liability in ton. 
37. Seller, denned as one who sells, distributes, leases, assembles, installs, produces, manufac-
tures, fabricates, prepares, constructs, packages, labels, markets, repairs, maintains, or otherwise is 
involved in placing product in the stream of commerce. 
38. Product: anv tangible object or goods distributed in commerce. 
39 Period is twelve yean from date of first sale, lease, or delivery of pmwiion bv a seller, or 
ten vean from date of first sale, lease, or delivery of possession to initial user, consumer, or nonsefler, 
whichever period expires earlier. If there is anv alteration, modification, or furnishing of materials 
*" tuch change, and there is proof that changed defective materials, workmanship, or specifications 
caused use injury, action must be brought within ten yean of such alteration. Notwithstanding 
the* limitations, if the injury complained of occun within any of those periods, suit may be 
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brought within two years after discovery of or, when through the use of reasonable dilig 
plaintiff should have discovered the injuries, but in no event more than eight years after th 
which such injury occurred. 
40. June 1, 1979 
41. Period of limitation does not apply if defendant has expressly warranted or pror 
product, or authorised alteration, for a longer penocL If person entitled to bnng action * 
time of injury under eighteen vears, insane, mentally ill, or imprisoned on criminal charge 
of limitation does not run until disability is removed. Dliooa has provisions requiring a c 
other than a manufacturer to idenurv the manufacturer: statute may be tolled to perm 
implementation of these provisions. See *u» note 38 svpr*. 
42. All theories, including negligence and strict liability in tort, but excluding actic 
on alleged breach of warranty.
 9 
43. Sellers, defined as manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, or distributors. 
44. Action must be commenced within ten years from delivery to initial user or const 
if injury occurs more than eight years but less than ten years after delivery, action mav 
menced at any time within two years alter cause of action accrues. 
45. June 1, 1978 (does not apply to a cause of action that accrues before that date 
46. Does not arTect the right of any person found liable to seek and obtain indemr 
any other person whose actual fault caused a product to be defective. 
47. Manufacturers and product sellers. The Latter are liable if their actions are tnvo 
the claimant is unable to obtain satisfaction from the manufacturer. 
48. There is a rebuttable presumption that useful safe life expires after ten ye 
delivery. 
49 There u no liability if the product seller "proves by a preponderance of the evtd 
the harm was caused after the product's 'useful safe life' had expired." 
50. Upon publication in the 1981 code. 
51 Manufacturers, excludes wholesalers, distributors, and retailers selling product ir 
condition or package unless they knew of defective condition or breached expressed war 
52. Product presumed not defective if injury occurs either more than five vears aft 
first customer or more than eight vears alter date of manufacture. Presumption is rebu 
preponderance of evidence. 
53. June 17, 1978. 
54. Manufacturers, sellers, or lessors of product; no action based on strict liability in 
be brought against seller or lessor unless he is also the manufacturer of product 
55. July 22, 1978. Any cause of action or claim that any person may have on that 
be brought not later than two vears following such date. 
56. Transactions governed bv U C.C § 2-725, and cases involving asbestos injuries 
57. Any legal theory whatsoever, except for actions based on fraudulent misrepre 
concealment, or nondisclosure; actions based on written contract providing a different 
limitation; and actions based on express or implied warranty that do not seek damages b 
injury to person or property 
58. Alter manufacturer of the ultimate product parted with possession and contro 
whichever occurred Last. 
59. If defendant is lessor, bailor, or licensor who has legal duty to inspect, maintain 
or improve, men twelve years from the time that duty ccasn; or if durv is imposed by gove 
agency to alter, recall, inspect, or issue warnings or instructions after plaintiff is in pos. 
product, then ux vears after defendant incurred such legal duty This latter provision 
shorten the existing tweive-vear period. 
60. August 22, 1978 (applies to all product liability actions accruing after this date 
causes accruing prior to this date on which no action has been instituted as of its efTec 
except that the time shall be computed from effective date). 
61. See note 58 mora. 
62. Specifically includes actions based on implied warranty; absence of privity is n 
63. Manufacturers and sellers, including lessors and bailors. So action, except bre. 
press warranty, shall be maintained against seller if product was acquired and sold 
container or seller had no opportunity to inspect. Provision does not apply if manuf 
insolvent. 
64. October 1. 1979; does not arTect pending litigation. 
65. Act specifies actions based on breach of implied warranties, defects in design, tr 
testing, or manufacture, failure to warn, or failure to instruct properly 
66. Manufacturers or sellers, if seller had actual knowledge of defect; furnished ipe 
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with defect; exercised significant control over manufacturer, modified product; or it owned by 
manufacturer. 
67. July 1, 1979. 
68. Limitation applies regardless of legal disability* but shall not apply to any cause of action 
msing within two years of effective date of act. If manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer issues recall, 
modifies product, or becomes aware of defect and fajh to warn user, limitation shall not bar action 
arising from defect. 
69. Actions arising out of any design, inspection, testing, manufacturing, or other defect in a 
product; any failure to warn regarding a product; or any failure to instruct properly in the use of a 
product. 
70. Manufacturer, distributor, seller, or lessor. 
71. January 1, 1978. 
72. Implied warrranty, failure to warn or instruct. 
73. Manufacturers or sellers. 
74. Act applies to all causes of action accruing after effective date (July 1, 1978). 
75. Manufacturers, lessors, or sellers. 
76. Date of delivery of completed product to first purchaser or lessee not engaged in business 
of selling such product. 
77. July 1, 1978 (does not apply to causes of action thai have arisen prior to that date). 
78. Manufacturer or seller, including lessor or bailor; no action may be maintained against 
seller if product was acquired or sold in sealed container, or if seller has no opportuniry to inspect. 
Seller exdudec* from actions based on strict liability in tort unless seller is manufacturer or unless 
manufacturer is insolvent or cannot be served process. 
79. Tangible object or goods produced. 
80. Under limitation provisions, action must be brought within six years of injury but not 
more than ten vears after date first purchased for consumption «r one year after expiration of 
product's anticipated life (which u placed on product by manufacturer, but does not run until 
purchase), whichever is shorter. 
81. Juiv 1, 1978. 
82. Minors must bring action one year after reaching majority. Limitations do not apply to 
action resulting from exposure to asbestos. 
83. Actions based on breach of implied warranty, defects in design, inspection, testing, or 
manufacture; failure to warn or instruct properly or any other alleged defect or failure of whatever 
kind or nature in relation to a product. 
84. Manufacturers or sellers. Immunity is given if alterations made subsequent to sale were a 
substantial cause of injury. 
85. Mav 10, 1977 (provisions of section on limitations shall not apply to anv cause of action if 
the personal injury, death, or damage to property occurs within two years of effective date of act). 
86. Manufacturers and product sellers. The latter are liable if their actions are involved or if 
the claimant is unable to obtain satisfaction from the manufacturer. 
87. "(Ojbject possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an assembled whole or as 
i component part or parts and produced for introduction into trade or commerce." 
88. There is no liability if the product seller "proves by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the harm was caused after the product's 'useful safe life' had expired." There is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that useful safe life expires after twelve years from delivery of product to fint purchaser or 
lessee. 
89. July 26, 1981 (applies to all actions in which trial has not occurred prior to this date). 
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State Equal Protection Due Process 
"Open Court 
& Remedy" Other 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
North Carolina 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
C 
c 
c 
c 
u* 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
u* 
c 
c 
c 
c 
U* 
u* 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
u 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
u* 
c 
c 
u* 
c 
c 
c 
u« 
u< 
Key: 
C = Ground addressed by court and found constitutional 
U = Ground addressed by court and found unconstitutional 
" - Statute subsequently amended with no new decision 
interpreting amended version 
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ARCHITECT AND BUILDERS STATUTES 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
INTRODUCTION 
In the following cases, various state courts have held their 
form of the architect-type statute of repose unconstitutional. 
1. ALABAMA 
Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So.2d 725 (Ala. 
1983) . The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the seven-year 
construction statute of repose was unconstitutional based upon 
the Alabama open court provision. The previous year the Court 
had struck down Alabama's product liability statute of repose as 
also in violation of the open court provision. Lankford v. 
Sullivan, Long & Haqerty, 416 So.2d 996 (Ala. 1982). The Court 
concluded that the defendants had failed to show a substantial 
relationship between the statute of repose and the eradication of 
any social evil required to make it constitutional. The Alabama 
legislature has not amended the statute subsequent to the 
decision. 
2. HAWAII 
The Hawaii Supreme Court in Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 
(Hawaii 1973) struck down the statute of repose on construction 
of real property. It did so on the basis that the statute denied 
equal protection since it unfairly discriminated against certain 
classes of individuals. Even though the statute was held 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds the court upheld it 
as to due process stating that there was a legitimate legislative 
purpose in enacting this type of statute. See Note, "Actions 
Arising Out of Improvements to Real Property: Special Statutes of 
Limitations", 57 N.D. L.Rev. 43, 75 (1981). 
Subsequently, the Hawaiian Legislature amended the statute 
and essentially included every type of company or individual 
which could be involved with the construction industry including 
owners, architects, contractors, suppliers, and materialmen. The 
court in 1982 again struck down this amended statute. 
Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 647 P.2d 276 (Hawaii 
1982). The court held that by including all members of the 
construction industry in this statute it denied equal protection 
to other members of the community who were in equal positions but 
who were not afforded such immunity. The court was particularly 
troubled by immunity given to a supplier of construction 
materials as opposed to no immunity given to a supplier of other 
types of materials. 
The court in reviewing the legislative purpose of the 
statute found that it had been enacted because construction 
records become lost and destroyed, the longer the statutory 
period the harder it becomes to distinguish between negligence in 
design or construction and negligence in maintenance, and that in 
Hawaii almost 80% of all claims are initiated in the first three 
years. The court refused to strike down the statute on the basis 
that it did not further a legitimate state objective and based 
its opinion entirely upon equal protection of classes. The 
Hawaii Legislature again amended the statute in 1983 and there 
have been no decisions interpreting the amended statute as of 
this time. 
3. KENTUCKY 
In Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1985) the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky held a five-year statute of repose 
unconstitutional based upon a provision in the Kentucky 
Constitution prohibiting local and special legislation. The 
court noted that there was no legislative history showing 
"committee meetings or legislative debate discussing its 
purpose." Id. at 184. Several of the justices of that court 
dissented on the basis that there was justification for 
establishment of building designers as a separate class of 
individuals. The Kentucky Legislature amended the statute in 
1986 but there have been no decisions interpreting it as of this 
time. 
4. NEVADA 
The Nevada Supreme Court in State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. All Electric, Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983) held the 
Nevada six-year statute of repose unconstitutional as a denial of 
equal protection. The court concluded there was no rational 
basis for giving special treatment to architects and contractors 
while not giving equal treatment to building owners and material 
suppliers. The dissenting opinion noted that the parties 
apparently agreed that the statute has a legitimate purpose: 
providing repose for otherwise indefinite potential liability and 
that the only challenge was that it unfairly discriminated 
against certain classes. Id. at 1002. (J. Springer, 
dissenting). The Nevada Legislature subsequently amended its 
statute in 1983 and there have been no reported decision 
interpreting the amended statute. 
5. OKLAHOMA 
In Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 
1977) the Oklahoma Supreme Court held its ten-year statute of 
repose unconstitutional as violating the federal and state equal 
protection clauses. While finding the statute unconstititutional 
on equal protection grounds the court concluded it did not deny 
due process of law and that no pre-existing right had been 
terminated. See Note, "Actions Arising out of Improvements to 
Real Property: Special Statutes of Limitations", 57 NoD. L.Rev. 
43, 75 (1981). The Oklahoma statute was amended in 1979 but 
there have been no subsequent decisions interpreting it. 
6. SOUTH CAROLINA 
In Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739 (S.C. 1978) the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a statute providing 
that any action brought against an architect, engineer or 
contractor must be brought within ten years after substantial 
completion violated the state's equal protection laws absent a 
showing of any rational basis for discriminating against the 
owners and manufacturers of components that go into the 
construction of a building. The statute was amended in 1986 by 
the South Carolina Legislature and there have been no subsequent 
decisions interpreting it. 
7. SOUTH DAKOTA 
The South Dakota Supreme Court in Daquaard v. Baltic 
Co-Op Building Supply Assn., 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984) held its 
six-year statute of repose unconstitutional as a violation of the 
state open court provision. The Court stated, "Appellants assert 
[that the South Dakota statute] unconstitutionally locked the 
courtroom door before Appellants had an opportunity to open it. 
We agree." Id. at 424. A dissenting opinion contended that 
the open court clause only guaranteed a right of access to the 
courts for redress as to causes of action recognized under common 
law or by statute and did not in and of itself create causes of 
action. Id. at 427 (J. Wollman dissenting). In 1985 the 
former statute was repealed and a new statute was enacted which 
contained ten separate sections. There have been no reported 
court decision interpreting this new statutory enactment. 
8. WYOMING 
In Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 
1980) the Wyoming Supreme Court held its ten-year statute of 
repose unconstitutional in violation of its open court provision, 
its provision requiring that all laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation, and a provision that special laws shall 
not be passed where general laws can be made applicable. The 
court in its opinion reviewed the various cases that as of 1980 
had been decided. Several of the states which the court cited as 
having struck down statutes of repose subsequently approved such 
statutes. See e.g., Illinois, Matayka v. Melia, 456 
N.Eo2d 353 (111. App. 1983); Wisconsin, U.S. Fire Ins. Co, v. 
E.D. Wesley Co., 301 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. App. 1980); Minnesota, 
Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982); and 
Michigan, O'Brien v. Hazelet and Srdal, 299 N.W.2d 336 
(Mich. 1980) . The Wyoming Legislature amended its statute in 
1981. There have been no subsequent decisions interpreting it. 
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APPENDIX VI 
SUMMARY OF DECISIONS BY STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS UPHOLDING ARCHITECT AND BUILDERS 
STATUTES OF REPOSE 
The following cases represent decisions from state and 
federal courts upholding the constitutionality of architect and 
builder statutes of repose. These decisions relate to attacks of 
equal protection, procedural due process, access to the courts, 
and special legislation. 
1. ARKANSAS 
In Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d 918 (Ark. 1970) the 
court sustained a statute of respose which eliminated builder and 
architect liability after four years from substantial completion 
of construction. The court found that the equal protection 
clause of the state constitution as well as the federal 
constitution had not been violated by limiting the classes of 
individuals subject to the protection of the statute. The court 
also observed that the legislation did not amount to a special 
privilege or immunity prohibited by the state constitution. 
The Carter decision was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court which dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question. 401 U.S. 901 (1971). Numerous courts have equated the 
dismissal for lack of a federal question with a decision on the 
merits. See, Hartford Fire Ins. v. Lawrence, 740 F.2d 
1362, 1366 (6th Cir. 1984); Annotation, 45 L.Ed.2d 791. 
2. CALIFORNIA 
The California Supreme Court approved a ten-year statute of 
limitation on construction in Regents of the University of 
California v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 147 Cal. 
Rptr. 486, 581 P.2d 197 (Cal. 1978). 
In 1981 the California Court of Appeals in Salinero v. 
Pon, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Cal. App. 1981) held that the statute 
did not violate either due process or equal protection of the 
state and federal constitutions. Id. at 209-210. 
Later, in 1982 the Court of Appeals in Barnhous v. City 
of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. App. 1982) expanded upon the 
previous decision. The court held there was a rational basis as 
far as the equal protection argument to distinguish contractors 
and architects from owners, materialmen and suppliers. Id. at 
888. 
The court cited the prior language of the California Supreme 
Court in the Regents case in upholding the claim that the 
statute violated procedural due process. The court observed that 
this type of statute which runs from the date of an event rather 
than the date of discovery is a valid legislative prerogative. 
The court concluded by stating, "To accept Appellant's 
argument—that they must be permitted reasonable time from the 
discovery of the damage to bring their lawsuit—would render the 
discussion in Regents meaningless." Id. at 889. 
3 . COLORADO 
The Supreme Court of Colorado (en banc) in Yarbro v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1983) upheld the 
constitutionality of the ten-year Colorado statute of repose. 
The court held that the statute did not deny due process since it 
was rationally related to a legitimate state objective. This 
objective was to eliminate the enormous liability for 
professional architects and engineers resulting from the 
long-standing buildings that are completed. In addition, the 
court addressed the problems involved with proof and the standard 
of care that would have to be shown from a building built many 
decades before. Id. at 826. The court also upheld the claim 
that the statute denied equal protection finding that the classes 
of individuals designated in the statute was reasonable. 
Finally, in addressing the open court provision of the Colorado 
Constitution the court held that the cause of action against the 
architect never arose or vested and therefore there was no denial 
of access to the court since a remedy was not available. 
In 1984 the court again addressed the same statute. In 
Criswell v. M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc., 681 P.2d 495 (Colo. 
1984) the court upheld an amendment to the statute which added 
additional classes of protected groups. Again, the court held 
that equal protection had not been violated. 
4. DELAWARE 
The Supreme Court of Delaware in Cheswold Volunteer Fire 
Co. v. Lambertson Construction Co., 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1985) 
upheld the six-year statute of repose. The court concluded that 
the statute bore a reasonable legislative objective in preventing 
actions to be maintained against architects or their heirs many 
years after the buildings had been completed and after evidence 
and other vital witnesses were no longer available. 
The court also upheld the statute based upon the "remedy for 
injury clause" by holding that the legislature was empowered to 
abolish common law causes of action in order to attain a 
permissible legislative objective. Finally, the court sustained 
the statute based upon equal protection by finding that 
architects and engineers worked under special circumstances as 
compared with suppliers, manufacturers, and owners. The court 
then reviewed the cases from seven other jurisdictions in which 
statutes had been held unconstitutional and stated that these 
cases represented a minority view and the Delaware Supreme Court 
chose to follow the majority rule in finding these type of 
statutes constitutional. Id. at 419. 
In 1986 the Supreme Court of Delaware again addressed the 
constitutionality of this statute in City of Dover v. 
International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 514 A.2d 1086 (Del. 
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1986) . The court concluded that this statute did not violate a 
provision in the Delaware Constitution prohibiting special laws 
to be enacted nor did it violate a provision requiring the title 
of enacting legislation to clearly identify its subject matter. 
5. FLORIDA 
In 1979 the Supreme Court of Florida held its twelve-year 
statute of repose on construction to be unconstitutional on the 
basis that it denied access to the courts. Overland 
Construction Co., Inc., 369 S.2d 572 (Fla. 1979). The court 
concluded that the legislature had failed to show an overpowering 
public necessity for the prohibititory provision. 
In the following year the Florida Supreme Court in Batilla 
v. Alice-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1980) held that 
the Florida product liability statute was also unconstitutional 
in that it violated the state open court provision. The court in 
Batilla relied upon the Overland decision in its analysis. 
In 1985 the Florida Supreme Court reversed itself as to the 
product liability statute of repose and in Pullum v. 
Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1985) stated that the 
product liability statute of repose was constitutional in terms 
of the open court provision of the Florida Constitution. The 
Court noted, "The legislature, in enacting this statute of 
repose, reasonably decided that perpetual liability places an 
undue burden on manufacturers, and it decided that twelve years 
from the date of sale is a reasonable time for exposure to 
liability for manufacturing of a product." Id. at 659. 
See also, Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 
631 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Fla. 1986). 
After the Overland Construction Co. case the Florida 
legislature amended its building statute of repose including an 
extensive preamble showing legislative intent. The Florida Court 
of Appeals in American Liberty Ins. Co. v. West and Convers, 
491 So.2d 573 (Fla. App. 1986) held that the new amended 
statute was constitutional as to the open court provision. The 
court relied upon the new language contained in the statute 
showing legislative intent and also upon the Florida Supreme 
Court's decision in Pullum which overruled Batilla and impliedly 
overruled Overland Construction Co. 
6. GEORGIA 
In Nelms v. Georgian Manner Condominium Assn., 321 S.E.2d 
330 (Ga. 1984) the Supreme Court held that an eight-year statute 
of repose on construction did not unconstitutionally deny access 
to the courts. The court distinguished the Constitution of 
Georgia from that of Kentucky, Florida and Alabama. The court 
concluded that the "right of access" in Georgia was- limited to 
insuring the right of self-representation to every person. The 
A_9A 
court noted, however, that there were other decisions by other 
state supreme courts in which the "right of access" was held not 
to prevent the legislature from altering common law or statutory 
causes of action. 
7. IDAHO 
The Idaho Supreme Court upheld its six-year architect 
statute of repose on the basis that it did not violate the state 
constitution's "remedy" provision, federal and state requirements 
of equal protection, nor a state constitution provision 
forbidding special laws. The Court stated that there was a split 
of authority in the country but that it chose to follow the 
majority view. 
8. ILLINOIS 
The Illinois Supreme Court in Skinner v. Anderson, 231 
N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967) held that the statute of repose was 
invalid because it granted exclusive immunity to architects and 
contractors and was not reasonably related to any legislative 
purpose. Subsequently, in 1982 the Illinois Legislature amended 
the prior statute. The Illinois Supreme Court held a statute of 
repose relating to medical malpractice constitutional on the 
basis that the classification for a reasonable relation to the 
purposes of the act and the evil it sought to remedy. 
Anderson v. Wagner, 402 N.E.2d 560 (111. 1980). 
The Court of Appeals of Illinois in Matayka v. Mellia, 
456 NeE.2d 353 (111. App. 1983) upheld the constitutionality of 
the revised statute on the basis that there was a permissible 
legislative purpose in enacting the statute thereby negating a 
claim of special legislation and satisfying state and federal 
due process. 
9. INDIANA 
The Federal District Court of Indiana in Daque v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19 (D. Ind. 1980) upheld a 
constitutional attack against the Indiana product liability 
statute of repose. The court observed that the Indiana 
Legislature clearly had the power to modify or abolish common law 
rights and remedies provided that no vested right was disturbed. 
The Indiana Supreme Court in Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 
418 N.E.2d 207 (1981) held that the product liability statute of 
repose did not violate the open court provision of the Indiana 
Constitution. 
In 1983 the Court of Appeals in Beecher v. White, 447 
N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983) upheld the ten-year construction 
statute of limitations. The Indiana Appellate Court cited 
numerous decisions by various courts throughout the country both 
sustaining and overruling architect-type statutes. The court 
denied the equal protection attack upon the statute on the basis 
A - 9 ^ 
that an owner was in a different classification than a builder or 
architect since the owner has continuing control over the 
building and is able to prevent deterioration. The court 
observed that in view of the fact that so many of the courts in 
other jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of the acts 
as a permissible classification "it would be intellectual 
arrogance on our part to classify the act of our own legislature 
as manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary." Id. at 627. The 
court observed that the clear trend of the decisions throughout 
the country uphold the statutes and that the Supreme Court of 
Indiana had indicated its approval of these principles in the 
product liability and malpractice areas. 
The court dismissed both the due process and the open court 
arguments on the basis that the Indiana Supreme Court in Dague 
had held that there was no right in a plaintiff for the 
continuation of a common law action which had not vested and the 
legislature had the power to alter or abolish it. 
10. LOUISIANA 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1978 upheld its ten-year 
statute of repose against charges that the statute offended equal 
protection, due process, and a person1s right of access to the 
court. In Bermaster v. Gravity Drainage District No. 2, 
366 S.2d 1381 (La. 1978) the court found that there was a 
reasonable classification between persons performing or 
furnishing the design, planning and supervision of construction 
from the owners or tenants who later take control. Likewise, not 
including suppliers and manufacturers of building materials was 
also not a violation of equal protection since this group 
manufactures goods in a controlled environment whereas 
contractors and architects are limited in their ability to 
pretest and standardize. 
The court next addressed the contention that the statute 
violated the due process clause of the federal and state 
constitutions as well as the open court clause of the state 
constitution. The court held that there was no vested property 
right in the plaintiff since the right did not begin until the 
death of the decedent which had occurred more than fifteen years 
after the building was completed. The court concluded by stating 
that the statute does not bar plaintiff's cause of action but 
rather prevents what otherwise might be a cause of action from 
ever arising. 
11. MARYLAND 
In Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 499 A.2d 178 
(Md. 1985) the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld its ten-year 
statute of repose by ruling that the statute did not violate 
equal protection, was not a law for a special or individual case, 
did not violate the "remedy" provision of the state constitution, 
and did violate other local provisions of the state constitution. 
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The court found a rational purpose in the legislation by 
encouraging architects and engineers to experiment with new 
designs and materials. In addition, it found that these 
individuals were unable to monitor a building after it was 
completed. The court also found that it was not unconstitutional 
to separate suppliers of material and equipment from the 
classification of architects and engineers. 
12. MASSACHUSETTS 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Klein v. Catalano, 
437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982) upheld its six-year statute of repose 
and rejected claims that the statute violated equal protection, 
due process, or the remedy by recourse of laws provision of the 
state constitution. The court found the statute did not violate 
due process since no person has a vested interest in any rule of 
law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for 
his benefit. Since the accident in this case occurred eight 
years after the statute's date the application of the statute did 
not adversely affect any vested substantive right of the 
plaintiff. 
The court found a rational basis for enacting the statute to 
eliminate stale claims, and to prevent claims from being brought 
where evidence was no longer available to either party. The 
court noted that it may disagree with the philosophy of the 
legislature but that it was not its role to question it as long 
as there was a rational basis. The court stated, "The 
legislature could reasonably conclude that the statistical 
improbability of meritorius claims after a certain length of 
time and the inability of the courts to adjudicate stale claims 
weigh more heavily than allowing the adjudication of a few 
meritorius claims." Id. at 521, fn. 11. 
As to the remedy provision of the state constitution the 
court acknowledged that the statute abolished a cause of action 
without providing an alternate remedy. The court upheld the 
statute on the basis that it was rationally related to a 
permissible legislative objective. The court also observed that 
while in some cases the statute may impose great hardship on a 
plaintiff who has suffered injury and who has a meritorious claim 
the arguments as to hardship are appropriate for legislation and 
not for court interpretation. Id. at 522. The court upheld 
the equal protection attack on the basis that the classification 
was reasonable. 
13. MICHIGAN 
The Supreme Court of Michigan in 1980 upheld its six-year 
statute of repose in O'Brien v. Hazelet and Erdal, 299 
N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1980). The Supreme Court of Michigan rejected 
the argument that the statute violated due process by barring a 
cause of action before it arose. The court stated, "If the 
Legislature can entirely abrogate a common law right, surely it 
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may provide that a particular cause of action can no longer arise 
unless it accrues within a specified period of time." Id. at 
341. The court also upheld the statute based upon equal 
protection finding that the classification of engineers and 
architects was reasonable even though contractors and materialmen 
were excluded. 
14. MINNESOTA 
In Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982) 
the court upheld the Minnesota fifteen-year statute of repose. 
In doing so it distinguished its 1977 decision of Pacific 
Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeqer, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 
1977) which held an earlier version of the statute to be 
unconstitutional. The court concluded that the amended statute 
did not offend equal protection since the classification of 
individuals by the legislature was reasonable. 
The court also upheld the statute based upon federal and 
state due process clauses as well as a remedy of injury clause in 
the state constitution. The court recognized the principle that 
the legislature could constitutionally eliminate a common law 
right without a reasonable substitute if it is pursuing a 
permissible and legitimate legislative objective. 
15. MISSISSIPPI 
In Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr. Inc., 
402 So.2d 320 (Miss. 1981) the Supreme Court held the statute of 
repose limiting to ten years the liability of persons involved in 
the design, plan, supervision and construction of real property 
did not violate the state constitutional provision guaranteeing 
access to the courts nor was it an unconstitutional special or 
local law. The court reviewed the various decisions throughout 
the country both upholding and striking down these type of 
statutes but concluded that the decisions findings these statutes 
were a legitimate exercise of legislative power were more 
persuasive and thereby upheld the Mississippi statute. The court 
rejected the contention that plaintiffs had been denied access to 
the courts and stated that there is no vested right in any 
remedy for torts yet to happen and except as to vested rights the 
state legislature has full power to change or abolish existing 
common law remedies and methods of procedures. Id. at 324. 
16. MONTANA 
The Supreme Court of Montana in Reeds v. Ille Electric 
Co. , 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976) upheld its ten-year statute of 
repose. The court held that the statute did not violate the 
access to the court provision of the state constitution, the 
federal and state constitutional provisions for equal protection 
and due process, as well as several other state constitutional 
provisions. The court reviewed the history of the Montana 
Constitution which provides that courts of justice shall be open 
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to every person and speedy remedy afforded. After reviewing 
several older cases interpreting this provision the court stated, 
"Assuming arguendo, that plaintiff would have a claim under 
common law, the legislature is not constitutionally prohibited 
from eliminating a common law right . . . . [T]he legislature did 
not interfere with any vested right of plaintiff, but simply cut 
off accrual of the right to sue after ten years." Id. at 651. 
The court also in addressing the due process argument of the 
plaintiff held that an alterate remedy had in fact been provided 
to the plaintiff by allowing the plaintiff to sue the owner, 
tenant, or person in actual possession of the improvement at the 
time the cause of action arose. The court stated, "The plain 
words of Section 93-2621 refute the implication of plaintiff's 
argument that he is without a remedy." Id. at 652. 
17. NEW JERSEY 
In an early case relied upon by many later state courts, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 
293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972) upheld a constitutional attack on New 
Jersey's ten-year statute of repose. The court held that the 
effect of the statute is not to bar a cause of action but rather 
to prevent what might otherwise be a cause of action from 
arising. The court further held that the statute did not violate 
the equal protection clauses of the state or federal 
constitution 
18. NEW MEXICO 
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico in Howell v. Burk, 
568 P.2d 214 (N.M. App« 1977) affirmed a ten-year statute of 
repose. The court noted the historical reasons for enacting the 
statute which was to limit the exposure of builders and other 
persons in the building occupation after decisions had judicially 
expanded liability of these persons. The court found that as to 
the claim of equal protection there was a reasonable 
classification between the groups of individuals covered by the 
statute and those that were excluded. 
The court rejected the claim that the statute violated due 
process since it prevented plaintiff's cause of action before it 
had arisen. Relying upon the New Jersey case of Rosenberg v. 
Town of North Bergen, the court agreed with the New Jersey court 
in its finding that the legislature is empowered to prevent a 
cause of action from arising prior to the injury of the 
plaintiff. The court also noted it is not the function of the 
judicial system to determine social or economic policy which 
underlie the statute but rather is to determine whether the 
statute is unconstitutional. 
19. NORTH CAROLINA 
The North Caroline Supreme Court in Lamb v. Wedgewood 
South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1983) upheld the 
constitutionality of its six-year building statute. The court 
found that the classification of the various groups that were 
covered or not covered by the statute was reasonable and declared 
that the overwhelming majority of courts throughout the country 
have sustained these type of statutes based upon equal protection 
grounds. 
The court addressed the open court argument as to a North 
Carolina provision essentially identical to Utah's. The court 
cited the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, and the Mississippii Supreme Court. The 
court in noting that the remedy provision of the state 
constitution was qualified by the words "due course of law" 
stated that this phrase meant the remedy must be one that is 
legally cognizable. "The legislature has the power to define the 
circumstances under which a remedy is legally cognizable and 
those under which it is not." The court also observed that since 
the plaintiff's cause of action had not accrued at the time the 
legislation was passed nc vested right was involved. 
In 1985 the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the 
constitutionality of the statute of repose relating to product 
liability cases. Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 332 S.E.2d 67 
(N.C. 1985). The court in referring to the Lamb decision 
noted that the statute of repose in Tetterton was designed to 
eliminate the possibility of manufacturers being indefinitely 
liable for products that were sold. The court concluded that the 
reasoning in Lamb was applicable to the product liability case 
and that the open court provision was therefore not violated. 
20. OHIO 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio in Elizabeth Gamble 
Deaconess Home Assn. v. Turner Constr. Co., 470 N.E.2d 950 (Ohio 
App. 1984) upheld its fifteen-year statute of repose. The court 
observed that due process was not violated by the passage of this 
statute since the legislature may abolish as well as create 
substantive rights of recovery. The court stated, "Due process 
may be violated if it is demonstrated that the legislation cannot 
be supported on any rational basis of fact that can reasonably be 
conceived to sustain it. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
that there is no rational basis for this statute of repose." 
Id. at 957. 
The court listed the various states which had upheld or 
rejected similar statutes and stated that it was persuaded by the 
reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme 
Court and therefore aligned itself with that rule. 
That same year the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, 
Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984) upheld the same 
statute on several constitutional grounds including the access to 
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the court provision nearly identical to Utah's. The court 
observed that the open court provision of the Ohio Constitution 
was the equivalent of the due process clause of the Fouteenth 
Amendment. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that 
legislatures do not violate federal due process rights by 
creating statutes of repose that prevent causes of action from 
accruing. "A litigant has no vested property right in a cause of 
action until it accrues." The court then quoted the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) recognizing this 
principle. 
The Federal Circuit Court noted that the provision of the 
Ohio Constitution guarantees a "remedy by due course of law" for 
"an injury done", but that state law determines what injuries are 
recognized and what remedies are available. It noted that the 
Ohio courts have never held that the open court provision in its 
constitution prevents the legislature from abolishing a cause of 
action. 
The court upheld the statute on the basis of equal 
protection stating that the distinctions made within the statute 
were legally justified. It distinguished the reasons for giving 
protection to an architect or engineer and not to an ower or 
tenant. The court concluded by stating as long as the 
classifications are rational and not arbitrary the requirements 
of equal protection are satisfied. 
21. OREGON 
In Josephs v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203 (Or. 1971) the 
Oregon Supreme Court upheld its ten-year statute of repose based 
upon an attack that the statute was unconstitutional because it 
violated the Oregon remedy by due course of law clause of the 
state constitution. The court in rejecting this argument 
concluded that the state constitution did not inhibit the 
legislature from altering common law rights. The court stated: 
It has always been considered a proper function of 
legislatures to limit the availability of causes of 
action by the use of statutes of limitation so long as 
it is done for the purpose of protecting a recognized 
public interest. It is in the interest of the public 
that there be a definite end to the possibility of 
future litigation resulting from past actions. It is a 
permissible constitutional legislative function to 
balance the possibility of outlawing legitimate claims 
against the public need that at some definite time there 
be an end to potential litigation. Id. at 208. 
22. PENNSYLVANIA 
In one of the leading cases in this area of law the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that its twelve-statute of repose 
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did not violate the open court and remedy provision of the state 
constitution. In Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork 
Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978) the court disagreed with the 
plaintiff that the legislature was required to substitute another 
means of redress before a right of action existing at common law 
could be eliminated. The court stated that no one has a vested 
right in the continued existence of a body of negligence law. 
The court said, "The practical result of a contrary conclusion 
would be the stagnation of the law in the face of changing 
societal conditions." Id. at 720. The court also made the 
following comments which have been widely utilized by other 
courts in interpreting their state constitutions. The court 
stated: 
This Court would encroach upon the Legislature's 
ability to guide the development of the law if we 
invalidated legislation simply because the rule enacted 
by the Legislature rejects some cause of action 
currently preferred by the courts. To do so would be to 
place certain rules of the "common law" and certain 
non-constitutional decisions of courts above all change 
except by constitutional amendment. Such a result would 
offend our notion of the checks and balances between the 
various branches of government, and of the flexibility 
required for the healthy growth of the law. Id. at 
721. 
The court upheld the statute on equal protection grounds 
based upon a number of distinctions between owners and builders. 
The court also found that the classification between builders and 
suppliers of building materials was rational and therefore 
constitutional. 
23. RHODE ISLAND 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island handed down two decisions 
relating to the constitutionality of the product liability 
statute of repose and the building statute of repose. In the 
first case, it held the statute to be unconstititutional. In the 
second, it held the statute to be constitutional. 
In Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 471 
A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) the court examined the relationship betwen 
the remedy clause of the state constitution and a statute which 
prevented an action to be maintained for a defective product ten 
years after the product was first purchased. The court stated: 
To prohibit court access absolutely for a generally 
recognized claim to a class of plaintiffs merely because 
they were injured by a product more than ten years old 
not only is irrational, in our opinion, but also flies 
in the face of even minimal constitutional protection 
mandated by Article I, Section 5. Id. at 198. 
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The court concluded that the remedy provision had been 
violated since product liability claimants injured by products 
more than ten years old were left with no forum in which to bring 
their claim. The court stated, HIf the constitutional guaranteed 
of right of access to the courts is to have any meaning, this 
statute must be struck down." Id. at 199. 
The following year the Supreme Court of Rhode Island dealt 
with the constitutionality of the building statute of repose. 
Walsh v. Gowinq, 494 A.2d 543 (R.I. 1985). The plaintiff in 
this case attempted to dismiss the appeal on the basis of the 
Kennedy decision. The court denied the motion to dismiss and 
directed the parties to brief and argue the constitutionality of 
the ten-year building statute. The court observed that the 
building statute had been passed as a result of a Rhode Island 
decision eliminating privity of contract as a requirement to 
maintain an action against a builder. 
The court in distinguishing the Kennedy decision noted 
that in Kennedy all remedies of the purchaser had been 
eliminated. On the other hand, the court cited an Illinois 
decision which interpreted the Illinois statute of product 
liability repose. There, the statute denied a plaintiff the 
right to a strict liability action but still permitted a 
negligence action to be made available. The court then observed 
a prior decision in which it allowed a statute to eliminate the 
liability of a charitable hospital but required that employees 
thereby be individually liable to the plaintiff. The Rhode 
Island court noted that this statute did not deprive the 
plaintiffs of their day in court but instead "left the plaintiffs 
with the remedy against agents or employees of the hospital who 
were initial tort feasors." Id. at 547. 
In using this same reasoning the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
found that a remedy was still existing even though not against 
the builder or architects of a building. The court stated.: 
In the case before us, an improver of real property 
will be subject to suit for ten years after its 
structure has been substantially completed. Thereafter, 
plaintiffs seeking damages can resort to the court for 
redress injuries arising out of improvements to real 
property against the owners or operators of that 
improved property. 
The judiciary, in abrogating the common law 
doctrine of privity of contract, exposed architects, 
engineers, and other improvers of real property to 
unlimited potential liability to third parties. The 
General Assembly responded by enacting Section 9-1-29 to 
limit this exposure. In doing so, it acted well within 
its constitutional authority. Id. at 548. 
24. TENNESSEE 
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The Tennessee Supreme Court approved its relatively short 
four-year building statute of repose in Harmon v. Agnus R. 
Jessup Associates, Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981). In 
upholding the statute in light of the Tennessee open court and 
remedy provision the court stated that the legislation was 
reasonably related to the legislative concern and therefore it 
was constitutional. The court found that a four-year period of 
time was a sufficient period for the legislature to conclude that 
injuries resulting from poor construction and design would have 
occurred during this limitation. The court concluded by noting 
that while there was a decided split of authority in other 
jurisdictions regarding the validity of legislation the greatest 
number of decisions have sustained these type of statutes. 
Id. at 525. 
25. TEXAS 
A series of cases decided by the Texas Court of Appeals have 
upheld the constitutionality of the Texas ten-year statute of 
repose. In Ellerbee v. Otis Elevator Co,, 618 S.W.2d 870 
(Tex. App. 1981) the Court of Appeals interpreted its open court 
and remedy provision. The court stated that this section of the 
constitution "does not create any new right, but is a declaration 
of a general fundamental principle that for such wrongs as are 
recognized by the law of the land, the court shall be open and 
afford a remedy." Id. at 873. 
The court noted that neither the constitution of the United 
States nor of Texas forbids the abolition of common law rights of 
action in order to attain a permissible legislative object. The 
court found the classification to be proper in excluding owners 
and materialmen from the protection of the statute. It should be 
observed that this case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court 
which dismissed it for lack of a substantial federal question. 
459 U.S. 802 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that 
by dismissing for lack of a substantial federal question, it is 
deciding a case on the merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 
332 (1975) . 
In 1983 the same Court of Appeals in Sowders v. M.W. 
Kellogg Co,, 663 S.W. 2d 644 (Tex. App. 1984) reaffirmed the 
Ellerbee decision and held that the statute did not violate 
either federal or state due process or the right of access clause 
of the Texas Constitution. 
In 1985 a separate court of appeals again upheld the statute 
on several claimed constitutional deficiencies. McCulloch v. 
Fox & Jacob, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App. 1985). The court 
stated that since the United States Supreme Court had dismissed 
the Ellerbee case for want of a substantial federal question 
that this decision eliminated any claim of a deprivation of due 
process or equal protection. The court then went on to address 
the open court and remedy provision of the state constitution. 
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The court stated that a "cause of action does not vest until an 
injury occurs; no one has a vested right in any common law rule, 
and the right to bring a common law action is not a fundamental 
right. Thus, the legislature may create new rights or abolish 
old ones to attain a permissible legislative objective." Id. 
at 924. 
The court found sufficient legislative purpose in the 
enactment of the statute to justify any constitutional attacks. 
26. WASHINGTON 
In Yakima Fruit and Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & 
Plumbing Co. , 503 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1973) the court upheld a 
constitutional attack upon the six-year statute of repose. The 
court found that the statute did not violate the equal protection 
clause of the United States Constitution and relied upon the 
Oregon Supreme Court case of Josephs v. Burns. 
27. WISCONSIN 
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin in United States Fire Ins. 
Co. v. E.D. Wesley Co., 301 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. App. 1980) 
rejected plaintiff's claim of a violation of due process rights 
contrary to the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions. The 
court stated that no violation may occur until a vested property 
right is in existence. Since the plaintiff had no vested 
property right until the pipeline burst and the injury was 
sustained there was no due process violation. 
A-35 
APPENDIX VII 
VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT PERTAINING TO HOUSE 
BILL NO. 4, FEB. 1967 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
S 7 A 7 S OF UTAH 
CkROLZ E . PTTZRSOX 
CHIEF CI^RK 
us rrxrx ZAjrroim SM»r uuae cmr e-Mt<s 
Sectsnrer 10, 1936 
Clausen, Miller, Gorsar., Caffrey & Witcus, ?.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
5400 Sears Tower 
Chicago, Illinois ' 60606 
ATTENTION: MR. FERRINI 
Dear Mr. * Ferrini: 
/ 
I , Carole E. Petersen, Chief Clerk, Utah Souse of Representatives, 
c e r t i f y that the attached verbatim transcript pertainirjg to Ecuse 3 i l l 
No. 4, February 1967, i s true and correct. 
Respectfully, 
CASCLE E. PEIERSCN 
Chief Clerk 
Enclosure 
A-36 
H0US2 3ILL #4 (73-12-25.5) Page 1 
TH2 RZADOG CLZZX; House Bill #4 by 
Representatives Hill, Mecham and Redd: An act enacting 
a new section 78-12-25#5, Subsection *5, Utah Code 
annotated 1953 relating to the limitations of action 
for Injury to property or death must be brought against 
persons who performed or furnished the design, planning, 
supervision or construction of improvements on real 
property* 
Be It enacted by the Legislature of the 
State of Utah: Section 1. Section 78-12-25, 
Subsection *5« Utah Code annotated 1953 is enacted to 
read: 78-12-25 Subsection
 #5# No action to recover 
damages-for any injury to property, real or personal, or 
for any injury to the person or for bodily injury of 
wrongful death arising out of the defective and unsafe 
condition of an improvement to real property, nor any 
action for damages sustained on account of such injuries 
shall be brought against any person performing or 
furnishing the design, planning
 f- supervision of -
construction or construction of such improvement to real 
property more than 4 years after the completion of 
construction* (1) "Person" shall mean an individual, 
corporation, partnership or any other legal entity. 
(2) Completion of construction shall mean that that 
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t i n e when the l a s t sa ter la i has been furnished and the 
l a s t labor performed Including a l l necessary small jobs 
I n c i d e n t a l to the completion of contractual o b l i g a t i o n s 
and I n c i d e n t a l to making the Improvement s u i t a b l e for 
I t s Intended use . The l imitat ion Imposed by t h i s 
p r o v i s i o n s h a l l not apply to any person in ac tua l 
p o s s e s s i o n and control as owner, t^enant or otherwise of 
the improvement at the time, the d e f e c t i v e and unsafe 
c o n d i t i o n of such Improvement c o n s t i t u t e s the proximate 
causa of the Injury for which i t Is proposed to bring an 
a c t i o n . This provis ion shall not be cmrjsrrued as 
extending or l i m i t i n g the periods otherwise prescribed by 
the laws of t h i s State for the bringing of any a c t i o n . 
Mr. Speaker: Your Committee on Business 
and Commerce to which was referred House 3111 #4 by 
Rep. H i l l e t a l , l imitat ion of cer ta in act ions has 
c a r e f u l l y considered said b i l l and reports the same out 
favorably with the following amendments: Page 1, l i n e 10, 
a f t e r the word, "than11 delete the word "four" and add the 
word n3^venif. Repeat: Page I, l i n e 10, af ter the word 
"than" d e l e t e the word "four" and add the word "seven". 
R e s p e c t f u l l y , Representative Frank V. Nelson, Chairman. 
TH£ CHAIR: Mr. Speaker, I move we adopt the 
committee report . 
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THZ CHAIR: It has been moved and seconded to 
adopt the committee report. 
All in favor, say aye. (aye) Opposed say 
no. Committee report is adopted. House 3111 #4 is 
before you and the Chair will recognize the chief 
sponsor of the Bill. Representative Hill. 
REP. HILL: Before we get too far into this, there 
has been passed an amendment which we propose to make' in 
the beginning of line 14. This amendment was written up 
before we had the new line delineations on the Bill, and 
so the top two lines are a little bit in error. But the 
amendment is to begin, will replace the subsection 2, 
beginning at line 14, with the information that is going 
to be passed out just prior to the convening time at 
2 o'clock. Delete that entire paragraph there and replace 
it with the one written, "Completion of construction for 
the purposes of this act,shall mean the date of issuance 
of a Certificate, of substantial completion by the owner, 
architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the 
owner's use or possession of the improvement on real 
property•" 
THS CHAIR: It's been moved and seconded that we 
amend House Bill #4 by replacing subsection 2 with the 
new subsection as just read. All in favor of the motion 
Page 4 
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s a y a y e . (aye ) Opposed say n o . So o r d e r e d . The B i l l 
i s amended, 2.ap r e s e s a c i v e H i l l . 
3
 II a 2 - " SILL: The reason for t h i s i s to g e t a l i t t l e 
* II aora c l e a r aeaning of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r phrase . " c o m p l e t i o n 
of c o n s t r u c t i o n " , as opposed to the one t h a t was w r i t t e n , 
o r i g i n a l l y w r i t t e n in the B i l l . We have a more or l e s s 
r e c o g n i s e d p r i n c i p l e of law - - I'm not a l a w y e r , I guess 
8 || I s h o u l d n ' t be speaking for a l l these.l-a-vyers - - but 
t h e r e i s a recognized p r i n c i p l e of law t h a t ho lds that 
a t some p o i n t t h e r e i s a n e c e s s i t y for a t ime to be 
e s t a b l i s h e d when r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s must be s e t t l e d . 
Now t h i s i s recognized in the f a c t tha t we have many 
s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s def ined by s t a t u t e and law that 
s t a t e s thaq a c t i o n in c e r t a i n c a u s e s and c e r t a i n c a s e s 
must be brought before a c e r t a i n d a t e . There i s a l i m i t 
beyond which a c t i o n cannot be brought . W e l l , t h i s i s a 
v e r y sound and p r a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e and i t ' s a l s o a good 
b u s i n e s s p r i n c i p l e because at some t ime t h e r e must be a 
p o i n t a t which o b l i g a t i o n s are c o n s i d e r e d s e t t l e d . I f 
y o u ' v e aada an error or you've aade a a i s t a k e , as a 
n a t u r a l c o u r s e , t h e y ' r e not he ld a g a i n s t you f o r e v e r in 
a c s t c a s e s . However, in the e n g i n e e r i n g and a r c h i t e c -
t u r a l f i e l d t h i s i s not s o , as d e f i n e d so f a r as 
d e f i n i t i o n in the s t a t u t e s are concerned . 
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1 !j The work chaC an engineer, an architect or contractor 
2 | or supervisor performs by statute can be held against 
3 him for his entire life, and in some cases, have been 
4 brought against the estate of the man after he is 
5 deceased* 
6 I Now it's recognized that that are some things 
that might enter intp this from the standpoint that if 
8
 you take away some — if you give rights in one place, 
9
 I then you have to take them away from some other place* 
This is probably so, but you must make, you must 
determine then, which will be for the good and best of 
all concerned* Now in this particular matter we have, 
it's been brought to our attention across the nation 
that it seems like we've become a suit-conscious people 
to the extent that when an action is brought, . everyone 
that had any connection with it, even sometimes down to 
the janitor, have been entered in as a party to the 
suit* This has been true of many engineering firms and 
many engineering and architectural people where action 
has been brought years and years after they have completed 
their service, the facility has been in use and a cause 
for at least proposed negligence has been brought and 
the person who is responsible for the construction of 
I the building in the original instance has been named as 
10 
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a party Co Che s u i t . Usually these have been able to 
be cleared buc not u n t i l much time and energy has been 
3 jl extended en Che part of chat person chac was responsible 
4 for chac design. 
5 Sow, Che face ehac ac some time chis cuCoff 
6 I should be i s recognized a l s o in Che Court because in 
some ins tances , in any kind of a s u i t , i f ehe matter i s 
8 II too long past , t h e y ' l l d ismiss i t because i t f s a s ta l e 
9 case* Witnesses, memories, records are so far in the 
10 I time pasc Chac i c f s d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h ceseimony, Co 
e s t a b l i s h some of Che things chac might be necessary for 
12 || a Court determination in t h e s e , and these have been 
dismissed on t h i s fac t because they ruled ehera had been 
as a maeter of equity in j u s t i c e no attempts to rule on 
t h o s e . So Chis B i l l , while i t does gee into a l i t t l e 
b i t d i f ferent area in our l e g a l f i e l d , in the fact that 
most actions s t a r t from the time Chey have been discovered 
or could have been d iscovered . This i s ehe usual l imita-
t i o n . This 3111 says that the ac t ion or l imi tat ion sha l l 
s t a r t from ehe time chac Che f a c i l i t y i s completed or 
has been turned over to ehe owner or user , whoever ehe 
work was being performed f o r . The o r i g i n a l 3 i l l is 
w r i t t e n up for four years , which i s a usual , which has 
* 4 il i 
i been done in manj other States but we re willing to go 
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with this 7-year program In some States it's nore and 
in others
 9 it is less. How this type of proposal is not 
new. We have many States that have enacted similar 
legislation recognizing the problem that is created by 
having people on the hook, so to speak, for their entire 
lifetime* I111 list yon briefly the ones that have 
enacted statutes in this same area: Idaho, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Hew Hampshire, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia and Wisconsin. Idaho being 
the last, they passed one at their last Special Session 
just a year ago*. And so we're asking for this considera-
tion to the people that are involved in the construction 
and design business that this type of thing might be 
enacted* I think Mr. Mecham, Representative Mecham, 
has some other areas to bring in on the legal side of 
the thing and an explanation of the "why" of this Bill* 
I'd entertain any questions and any answer concerning 
questions that may be in the minds of some of Che 
representatives on the floor. 
TEZ CHAIR; Is there a question? 
(Inaudible) 
Rep. Arbuckle? 
REJ. AR3UCXLZ: Representative Hill will yield to 
a question? 
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REP. HILL: Yes , s i r . 
REP. AR3UCKLE: You were mentioning some of t h e s e 
o t h e r S t a t e s that have enac ted t h i s type ox l e g i s l a t i o n . 
What i s the l ength of t i n e most of them have f o r the 
t ime t h e y ' r e held a c c o u n t a b l e for? 
REP. HILL: I can read t h o s e . Idaho s e t t h e i r s 
a t 9 y e a r s ; I l l i n o i s at 6 y e a r s ; Lousiana at 10; 
Minnesota 10; New Hampshire, 6; North Caro l ina 6; 
Ohio 10; Tennessee 4; V i r g i n i a 5; and Wisconsin 6 . 
So we1 re about in the same a r e a . 
REP. AR3UC5LE: No f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s . 
THE CHAIR: Are you ready for the q u e s t i o n on 
House B i l l 4? R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Simpson. 
REP. SIMPSON: W i l l Rep. H i l l y i e l d to a q u e s t i o n ? 
THE CHAIR: R e p r e s e n t a t i v e H i l l w i l l you submit 
to a ques t ion? 
REP. HILL: Yes . 
REP. SIMPSON: In r e f e r e n c e to o ther a g e n t s , would 
t h e s e be other agents of the owner or the a r c h i t e c t or 
t h e e n g i n e e r , the way t h i s has been w r i t t e n ? 
REP. HILL: Wel l , the owner in some c a s e s can have 
a s u p e r i n t e n d i n g , a c o n s t r u c t i o n superv i sor who would be 
a u t h o r i z e d to do t h i s . This would be agent or e i t h e r . 
So anyone - - someone would be author ized to make a 
A - 4 4 
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signature regarding this certificate of completion. 
REP. SIMPSON: May I question further, Mr* Speaker? 
THZ CHAIR: State your question* 
REP. SIMPSON: Say the biggest difficulty was :-• 
between the ovner and the engineer that the engineer's 
agents release the engineer fron this contention? 
THE CHAIR: Rep. Hill? 
REP. HILL: Let me clarify the one point concerning 
this completion of construction. This is a standard 
document used in the construction trade but not always, 
and just merely recognises that the facility has been 
completed* This doesn't relieve anyone from any action. 
It just indicates that the facility has been completed 
according to whatever prearranged agreement was made 
and that certain works has now concluded. 
RZP. SIMPSON: One final question, if I may. 
THZ CHAIR: State your question. 
RZP. SIMPSON: Have you ever known,Representative 
Hill, of a case where an ovner got fed up, shall we say, 
in waiting for these people to finish his home, and by 
necessity because his other home had been sold, had to 
move into this new and uncompleted home and this then 
would cut him off? 
THZ CHAIR: Representative Hill. 
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R£?. HILL: There are probably soae circumstances 
involving this that are surely true, to the extent 
3 jl that a contractor and owner relationship is probably 
* not on f i r s ground in the beginning, where perhaps this 
5
 I  could be. The mere fact that he has taken prossession 
would indicate that soae other arrangeaents had been 
sade, I would presuae, but I don't think we could cover 
8
 I  a l l of those situations by this particular statement. 
9
 TEZ CHAIR: Are you ready for the question on 
10
 1 House Bi l l 4? Rep. Carr. 
a£P. CARR: Will Representative Hi l l yield? 
6 
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 II THZ CHAIR: Will you subnit the question' 
13
 " R2P. HILL: I will . 
II 
u 
az?. CARR: I had a couple of questions. As I 
understaad the Bi l l , the-7-year statute of l ia i tat ions 
would apply, regardless of the question of when the 
defective condition was discovered. 
RE?. HILL: This is correct. 
az?. CARR: How as I understand, I'm. not well 
acquainted with a statute of this type, but I understand 
that in soae States, some of the laws provide that the 
tine runs from the discovery of the defect or when i t 
23 !l
 ccmes to light? 
RZ?. HILL: This is the usual pattern of action 
13 
16 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
* 24 
Page 11 
limitations as I understand it. This is a departure 
from that pattern* 
REP. CARS.: Well, as I read the last paragraph, 
the next to last paragraph, as I understand, the limita-
tion does not apply to the person in actual possession 
at the time the building was cons true ted • 
RE?. KILL: The time any action might be brought 
forth* 
REP. CARR: Well suppose •• 
REP. HILL: Is in actual possession at the time 
the defective or unsafe condition of such improvement 
was discovered. 
RE?.*CARR: Well how do you interpret that? 
That's the thing Ifm getting at. 
REP. HILL: The purpose of that particular 
statement was the fact that if action, as I understand 
it — as I say Ifm no lawyer « but if action was brought 
against — by someone who was injured on some property 
because of an unsafe condition, if he didnft state that 
the owner was not exempted by this provision, then he 
would be scot-free. It might be due to his negligence 
on his part, but the 3111 would preclude the addition 
of the engineer, designer or contractor as a third 
party to the suit, additional par^ias. But the owner 
Page 12 
would s t i l l — anyone would s t i l l have act ion against 
the owner or the one who had p o s s e s s i o n or control of 
the property at the t ine t h i s unsafe condit ion say have 
caused a problem* 
122. CARS.: Well, back to t h i s question of the tim 
the defect i s discovered* I 1 si not an engineer, and I 
d o n f t — i t seems to axe that i t might be • - I think 
there should be a s tatute of l i m i t a t i o n s on th is type of 
a c t i o n because - - there should be l i m i t a t i o n on every 
kind or most every kind of cause of ac t ion or lega l 
l i a b i l i t y , but I wonder about, i f you're not giving the 
publ i c a l i t t l e more protect ion i f you don ft provide in 
t h e r e , i f you should not provide that a l imi ta t ion period 
run from the time the defect i s d iscovered• I wonder 
what the committee, what your thinking on that was, for, 
ins tance i f you shorten the period from 7 years to say 
2 years or 3 from the time the de fec t or faul ty condit ion 
was ac tua l ly discovered? 
RZP. HILL: As I understand i t , the present 
s t a t u t e would apply on that b a s i s , and t h i s law i s 
asking for a departure from that in that the l imi ta t ion 
would begin from the time of the completion of the 
s e r v i c e s . How, th is i s net completely without precedent, 
although i t i s a new concept as far as the General 
4 
5 
6 
m 
i 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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Statute of Limitations is concerned. 
REP. CARS.: As I understand it, I'm sorry to take 
so much time — 
REP. HILL: This is all right, Representative Carr. 
REP. CARS.: As I understand, if the defect or if 
the injury, if the building for instance, collapsed 
8 years after construction, under this statute there 
would be no liability* 
REP. HILL: There would be no liability to the 
engineer or the contractor; the owner would still be 
held liable. 
REP. CARR: There would be no liability to the 
owner, the engineer or the architect contractor? 
REP. HILL: Right* Unless of course, a fraud, 
these type of things would still hold I'm sure, if 
there had been some other factors that could enter into 
this. I donft believe he's relieved scot-free, but this 
would preclude primarily any of these third party 
propositions. 1 might clarify this one thing just a 
little further, if 1 may. We feel that there is a tine 
testing of the design capabilities of the design that 
has been furnished, and if there are any major errors 
or omissions, the team of the designer, the owner and 
the contractor should be able to uncover any major ones, 
Page U 
1 such as you1 re a l l famil iar w i th , the one concerning 
2
 the Savings & Loan 3ui lding on Main Street* The error 
3
 | there in the combination of things that entered into i t 
4
 showed up immediately because they had some bean f a i l u r e s . 
5
 This type of thing, the f igure or main thing that the 
8
 II 7-year period i s a t ine t e s t of anything that could be 
of s i g n i f i c a n c e . There might be some minor, I don't 
8
 jj think any of us are p e r f e c t . When you say that anything 
would be perfect after passing a 7-year period, but we 
f e e l that the 7-year time t e s t i s adequate to protect 
the public in th is case and g ive repose and r e l i e f to 
the peaceful a t t i tude of the designer who knows not now 
h e f s held forever for that design and can be brought in 
as part of the su i t should one occur* 
R£P. CARR: Thank you. 
TH2 CHAIR: Thank you Rep. Hill. Rep* Wheeler, do 
you have something youfd like to add? 
RZP. VHZZLZR: Ifd just like to add, Mr. Speaker, 
as a member of that committee, we discussed this with 
Rep. Mecham and it came into question of fraud or 
criminal negligence and it was his -• as I understand 
the interpretation, that this wouldn't eliminate any 
charges of fraud and criminal negligence in the design 
of the building. That comes under a separate statute, 
A-50 
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1 I is chat right
 9 &ep« Mac ham? 
2 3.Z?. MECHAM: That is correct• 
3 TEZ CHAI3.: Are you ready for the question? 
* Any question on House Bill *4? The Chief 
5 Cleric will call the roll on House Bill 4, 
S THZ CHI2F CLZRX: Aagard (aye); Anderson, G.T«.(aye) 
1 Anderson, R«Ce (aye); Arbuckle (aye); Bagley (aye); 
8 Behunin (aye); Benson (no); Bittner (aye); Brady (aye); 
9 Bronson (aye); Brough (aye); Buhler (aye); Cannon (aye); 
10
 Carling (no); Christens (yes); Cox (aye); Darger (aye); 
11
 Day (aye); Dennis (aye); Drake (aye); Eskelsen, (aye); 
12
 Fisher (aye); Fowler (aye); Frost (Inaudible); Gllman. 
13 THZ CHAIR: Rep# Gilman wishes to explain his vote, 
II * 
w £ 5 ? . GILMAH: Mr. Speaker, I t h i a k i t would be 
15 n i c e i f t h e y ' d f o r g i v e a l l our mis takes i a 7 y e a r s , but 
16 1 d o n ' t th ink they should be any more excused than the 
1" r e s t of a s . I v o t e n o . 
18 TH2 CHAI3.: R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Gi laan v o t e s n o . 
19 THZ CHIZ7 CL22Z: Eal laday ( a y e ) ; Halverson ( a y e ) ; 
2° Harding ( i n a u d i b l e ) ; Harvard (yes); H i l l ( y e s ) ; 
21
 Hodgkinson ( a o ) ; Hol t ( a y e ) ; Hunter ( a y e ) ; Inkley ( a y e ) ; 
— Jack ( y e s ) ; Jones ( y e s ) ; Knowlton ( a y e ) ; Leatham ( y e s ) ; 
23
 Lingard ( a y e ) ; Lover idge (j^s); Ludvig ( n o ) ; 
2
* I Mather ( n o ) ; Mechaa ( y e s ) ; M i t c h e l l ( a y e ) ; N i a l s o a ( n o ) ; 
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Hielson (aye); Oberhansley (yea); Pace (nal; Petersen 
<7es); Plane (inaudible); Powell (yes); Preece (yes); 
Redd (aye); Reese (aye); Regis (aye); Russell (inaudible); 
Sanders (aye); Savage (79s); Smith (no); Scone (no); 
Suasion (yes); Th.eur.2r (yes); Thurston (yes); 
Wheeler (yes); Whiting (aye); Wilkinson (no); Williams 
(no); Young (aye). 
Mr. Speaker (aye), 
TH2 CHAIR: (Pause) House Bill #4 having received 
53 yes votes, 12 no votes, 4 absent and not voting, has 
received a constitutional majority. (Pause) 
H.3. #4 having received 53 votes, 12 no votes, 
4 absent and not voting, has received its constitutional 
majority and should be transmitted to the Senate for 
their further action. The Reading Clerk will now read 
House Bill #38. 
SZHATS 
(inaudible) Nest 53-12-25.5 (inaudible) 
(inaudible) 
The amendment we got to the committee (inaudible) 
i all in favor say aye. (aye) Opposed? Carried. The 
I House Amendments will be found on the 25th day in the 
1 
II 
! House Journals, 25th day in the House Journals, page 13. 
! House 3111 H (inaudible). 
11 
: SS3A703 3CCX3Z2: Mr. President? 
II ?age 17 
1 •• Senator 3uckner. 
2 SENATOR 3UCZ:iZR: Mr. President ve believe the 
3 law that has been presented to you is one that provided 
4 for a statute of limitations for an area of our industry 
5 and our econocy that has not formerly been completely 
6 covered by the lav. 'Utah statutes today include 
7 some 15 or more laws that are of a limitation nature 
8 covering broad groups of action. However, there is no 
9 specific statute offered for the reasonable protection 
10 of building industry, contractors, subcontractors, 
U suppliers, engineers or architects and they're now liable 
12 basically for a lifetime for these actions. And this 
13 legislation provides liability for personal injury or 
i! * 
U building defects to be brought by 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, to 
15 100 years after the building basically has been completed, 
16 In the interest of the 25 year old building, most of 
17 those involved with design and construction, be they 
18 deceased or retired, if retired, and they can be 
19 completely innocent. They must, however, go through the 
20 expense of defending any action *to prove their innocence. 
21 I Building (inaudible) 
time and therefore you (inaudible) . The 
23 II industry believes that (inaudible) four years but 
24 Ij are willing to accept the 7-year situation as being 
A-5? 
Page 13 
consistent with other limitations. May I without 
prolonging debate just quickly point out to you that 
our statute of limitations now provides six years for 
acting on a written contract, four years for acts on 
an oral contract and three years on trespass, injury 
to property, fraud and estate, liability created by 
statute, 7-year statute for repossession of real property. 
So this is consistent with that. I would point out to 
you also that other states who have recently re-enacted 
the statute of limitationsr Idaho passed 9 years, 
Illinois 6 years, Louisiana 10 years, Minnesota 10 years, 
New Hampshire 6 years, North Carolina 6 years, Ohio 10 
years, Tennessee 4 years, Virginia 5 years, and Wisconsin 
6 years. So this, again, would be consistent with that. 
(tape fades) program has passed away, technically his 
heirs could even be brought into an action where there 
is no limitation based upon the fact that when people 
sue for damages if a building has something happen to 
it, they sue everyone they can get their hands on legally. 
And this means the builder, the architect, the owner, 
the former owner, and anyone they can legally sue. 
Consequently, I think the 3ill is logical and consistent. 
I would not want to prolong debate (inaudible^ 
that has a lot more information if the members of the 
A-54 
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1 body would like to go into it further, but in the 
2 I interest of tine, I think that basically, Mr. President, 
3 explains the bill. 
4 THZ CLZ3JC: Any further discussion on House 
5 Bill #4? 
6
 •• (inaudible) 
t •• A r e 7 o u ready for the question? 
8 All those in favor say aye (aye). Opposed? 
9 Carried. House Bill #4 having been read the second time, 
10 the question is shall House Bill #4 be read the third 
11 time? Roll call. (Inaudible) 
12 .. House Bill £4 shows 23 ayes, no nays, 5 absent. 
& Having received a constitutional majority and the 
l4s
 bill passes and will be referred to (Inaudible) 
15 
16 • . House Bill #4. 
17 .. House Bill #4 (Inaudible) 
18 .. House Bill #4 for discussion. (Inaudible) 
19 Are you ready for the question? Ail those in favor say 
20 aye. (aye) Opposed? Motion carried. House Bill #4 
21 having been read the third time and that's the final 
II 
22 passage. The question is shall House Bill #4 pass? 
23 • . (inaudible) 
24 •• House Bill #4 shows a final passage, 13 ayes, 
11
 A-55 
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1 j| no nays, 10 absent. Having received a constitutional 
2 I aajoritj, the bill passes and will be signed by the 
3
 jl President and the (inaudible) 
+ I  after which it will be transmitted to the "House for 
5 I the signature of the Speaker of the House 
6 
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1 || STATS OF ILLINOIS ) 
) SS 
2 || COUNTY OF COOK ) 
3-
4 II JOHN F. ROBERTSON, being first duly sworn, 
5 on oath says that he was provided with a tape record-
6 ing of proceedings had in the matter of House Bill 4, 
7 enacting a new Section 73-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated 
8 1953. 
9 He further says that a transcript was pre-
10 pared front the said tape and that the foregoing is a 
11 true and correct transcript of said tape, except for 
12 portions indicated as inaudible, to the best of his 
13 knowledge and belief. 
14 
15 
16 
17 || SU3SCRI3ED AND SWORN TO 
3EFORS MS THIS 19th DAY 
18 I OF AUGUST, A.D. 1986. 
-z. -z <£L vZrf «~i - ' 
is 
20 || NOTARY PUBLIC, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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As the Official Officer and Secretary of the Utah 
State Senate I do hereby certify that the transcript 
relating to H.b. No. 4, as submitted to our office 
for verification, is a TRUE record WITH CORRECTIONS 
INSERTED IN RED, taken from the official recordings 
of the Utah State Senate. DAY 38" - FEBRUARY 15, 
1967. REGULAR SESSION OF THE 37th LEGISLATURE. 
<r. 
Sopnxa C. Buckaxller 
O f f i c i a l Off icer 
* Sec. of the 
Utah State Senate 
My Commission expires May 1, 1987 
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HOUSZ BILL NO. 4 • THIRD READING CALENDAR ROLL CALL: 
ALSOP 
BARNETT 
BROOC3AiTK 
BUCKNER 
BULLEN 
BUNNELL 
BURT 
Burton 
Call 
C.R.' Clark 
E.t. Clark 
Clyde 
Dean 
Evans 
Ferry 
Gardner 
Greenwood 
Hardward 
Jenkins 
Leavitt 
Mackey 
Mantes 
Pugh 
Rees 
Taylor 
Welch 
Yorgason 
Mr. President 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Absent 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Absent 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Aye 
Absent 
Aye 
Absent 
Absent 
Aye 
Aye 
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APPENDIX VIII 
CHART FROM REPORT OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AS REPORTED IN COMMENT, 
"LIMITATION OF ACTION STATUTES FOR ARCHITECTS 
AND BUILDERS—BLUE PRINTS FOR NON-ACTION", 
XVIII CATHOLIC U.L.R. 361 (1969) 
STUDY OF DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMS 
BY LENGTH OF TIME 
Number of years after 
completion of project 
before claim is 
brought 
Number of 
claims 
Percentage of 
claims 
Cumulation 
percentage 
of claims 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Total 
215 
106 
96 
64 
31 
18 
28 
5 
3 
2 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
570 
3 7 . 7 
1 8 . 6 
1 6 . 8 
1 1 . 2 
5 . 4 
3 . 3 
4 . 9 
.8 
. 5 
. 4 
. 2 
. 2 
3 7 . 7 
5 6 . 3 
7 3 . 1 
8 4 . 3 
8 9 . 7 
9 3 . 0 
9 7 . 9 
9 8 . 7 
9 9 . 2 
9 9 . 6 
9 9 . 8 
1 0 0 . 0 
100.0 
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